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Abstract 
Recent financial literature suggests that the variation in the dividend–price ratio 
is significantly related to the expected returns but not to the expected dividend 
growth. In other words, stock returns are predictable but dividend growth is not. 
However, most of this evidence comes from the U.S. at the aggregate level, and 
there is a lack of research that relates to this topic in the New Zealand stock 
market. This research examines the predictive power of the dividend–price ratio 
using New Zealand stock market data from 1931 to 2012. The results confirm 
the claim in the U.S data that returns are predictable but dividend growth is not 
in the New Zealand stock market data. This research also investigates whether 
the return predictability is associated with risk-pricing or mispricing; whether 
the return predictability is due to the fundamental relationship among the 
dividend–price ratio, future returns and future dividend growth, or whether it is 
due to the effects of historical events; whether out-of-sample forecasts will have 
the same patterns as in-sample predictions; and whether individual company 
returns are predictable. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The predictability of stock market returns has become one of the most popular 
research topics in finance. This is not surprising, because return predictability is 
of interest to practitioners and it also has important implications for asset 
pricing for academics. The literature on return predictability has evolved 
significantly since late 1980s; in particular, return predictability became the 
winning topic of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2013.1 Testing stock market 
predictability was originally motivated by testing market efficiency. It was 
generally considered that return predictability would be inconsistent with the 
constant expected returns and the efficient market hypothesis. The efficient 
market hypothesis suggests that stock prices reflect all the available information. 
Therefore, stock returns follow a “random walk” pattern: though there are long 
sequences of positive and negative returns in history, the expected future return 
is always about the same. Using patterns from past returns to forecast the 
future returns is useless, as “any apparent predictability is either a statistical 
artefact which will quickly vanish out of sample or cannot be exploited after 
transaction costs”(Cochrane 1999). 
The possibility that stock returns can be predicted seemed unthinkable until the 
late 1980s, when several research papers started to document that stock returns 
were somewhat predictable (Campbell and Shiller, 1988a and 1988b; Fama and 
                                                             
1
The Nobel Prize in Economics 2013 was awarded jointly to Eugene F. Fama, Lars Peter Hansen and Robert J. 
Shiller for their significant contribution to return predictability research. 
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French, 1988a and 1988b). Since then, many researchers have begun to explore 
stock return predictability. Over the years, many variables have been found to 
have predictive power for stock returns. Most of these variables can be 
categorised into macroeconomic variables and valuation variables. On one hand, 
macroeconomic variables such as interest rates (Ang and Bekaert, 2006; 
Campbell, 1991; Ferson, 1989), inflation (Fama, 1981; Rapach et al., 2005), the 
industrial production index (Rapach et al., 2005), the consumption–wealth ratio 
(Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001) and the aggregate investment–capital ratio 
(Cochrane, 1991) are suitable for stock return predictions because the expected 
returns are usually highly correlated with the condition of the economy. For 
example, during economic downturns, the high risk-aversion of investors results 
in a high risk premium and hence the expected returns are high, and vice versa 
(Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001).  
On the other hand, valuation variables such as book-to-market ratios (Fama and 
French, 1992; Pontiff and Schall, 1998), dividend–price ratios (Campbell and 
Shiller, 1988a and 1998; Cochrane, 2008; Fama and French, 1988a) and 
earnings–price ratios (Campbell and Shiller, 1988a and 2001) have significant 
predictive power for stock returns because these ratios relate to both rational 
pricing and mispricing theories. For instance, the rational pricing view says that 
the ratios are associated with the time variation in discount rates. The ratios are 
positively correlated with discount rates and can therefore predict returns, 
based on the information reflected by the ratios on the risk premium. 
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Furthermore, the mispricing theory suggests that the ratios are high when the 
stocks are underpriced relative to their fundamental values. As investors realise 
this, prices adjust to their fundamental values and hence returns will be high, as 
predicted by earlier ratios.  
However, most of the evidence is from the U.S. and there have not been many 
studies that relate this topic to the New Zealand stock market. The first part of 
this thesis aims to bridge this gap and provides some New Zealand return 
predictability evidence using New Zealand stock market data from 1931 to 2012. 
Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature and discusses the controversies in the 
literature. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical background and the empirical 
methods. Chapter 4 contains a description of the data. Chapter 5 provides 
estimation results and an interpretation. Specifically, Chapter 2 to Chapter 5 are 
closely related to a branch of the return predictability research that has received 
a lot of attention in the literature (e.g., Cochrane, 1992, 2008 and 2011b; Lettau 
and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2008; Chen, 2009; Binsbergen and Koijen, 2010). This 
branch of research investigates stock return predictability using dividend–price 
ratios at the aggregate level by incorporating the restrictions associated with the 
Campbell and Shiller (1988a) present value relation. This branch of research also 
argues that return predictability driven by dividend–price ratios must be studied 
jointly with dividend growth predictability, because dividend–price ratios should 
forecast at least one of these two variables. 
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Moreover, to provide more convincing results, this thesis follows Cochrane 
(2008, 2011b), Lettau and Van Nieuwerburgh (2008), Chen et al.(2012) and 
others by using both a direct approach and a first-order vector autoregressive 
(VAR) approach to examine the predictability of the dividend–price ratios in the 
New Zealand stock market. The direct approach estimates univariate regressions 
of future returns and dividend growth on the current dividend–price ratios. The 
VAR approach investigates the predictability using first-order VAR 
representations of the returns, dividend growth and dividend–price ratio 
persistence. The difference between the two approaches is that the direct 
approach might provide more accurate estimates than the VAR approach if 
shocks in the current dividend–price ratio have long-lasting effects on the future 
returns or dividend growth. This is because the first-order VAR model might fail 
to capture any long-lasting effects, as there are restrictions imposed in the 
model. On the other hand, the VAR approach might provide better finite-sample 
properties, thus giving higher power against the null hypothesis of no 
predictability.  
Furthermore, unlike the traditional return predictability research, which usually 
uses up to a certain number of years as the regression horizon, the use of the 
first-order VAR approach allows us to examine the statistical power and 
economic significance of the return or dividend growth predictability at very 
long horizons. Very long horizon regressions carry more statistical power and 
economic significance than short to intermediate horizon regressions because 
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the high persistence of dividend–price ratios tends to outweight return or 
dividend growth predictability at short to intermediate horizons. This thesis also 
investigates the excess return predictability because it has also been the focus of 
the predictability literature (excess return predictability is jointly examined with 
excess dividend growth predictability). This thesis confirms the general findings 
of Cochrane (2008 and 2011b) in the New Zealand context:  
i) The real and excess returns are predictable at short, medium and 
long horizons, but real and excess dividend growth are not. 
ii) The real and excess return predictability increases with the horizon. 
The return predictability research has also raised some interesting questions: Is 
the return predictability associated with risk-pricing or mispricing? Is the return 
predictability caused by the fundamental relationships among the 
dividend–price ratio, future returns and future dividend growth? Or is it caused 
by the effects of historical events? What do out-of-sample forecasts look like? 
Are individual company returns predictable? It seems that there have not been 
many studies covering these questions in the New Zealand stock market. The 
second part of this thesis will address these questions. 
Chapter 6 answers whether return predictability is associated with risk-pricing 
or mispricing. The whole sample is divided into two subsamples (1931–1984 and 
1985–2012) distinguishing the periods before and after New Zealand financial 
sector reform in 1984. As the reform effectively removed many restrictions on 
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information flows that encouraged mispricing, the degree of mispricing in the 
post-reform sample should be lower than that in the pre-reform sample. If the 
New Zealand return predictability is due to mispricing, one would expect to see 
a stronger relationship between dividend–price ratios and future stock returns 
in the pre-reform sample and a weaker relationship in the post-reform sample. 
On the other hand, if the return predictability is due to risk-pricing, the financial 
sector reform should have no effect on the relationship between dividend–price 
ratios and future stock returns. By comparing the return coefficients of the two 
subsamples, this chapter finds that the return predictability in the New Zealand 
stock market is not primarily due to mispricing. 
Chapter 7 examines whether the return predictability is primarily due to 
fundamental relationships among the dividend–price ratio, future returns and 
future dividend growth, or whether it is due to the effects of historical events. 
To investigate which is the primary cause in the New Zealand stock market, I 
follow the idea of Cornell (2013 and 2014). A linear trend is used to represent 
the fundamental equilibrium values of dividend–price ratios over the sample 
period, followed by a regression model of the stock returns on the differences 
between the actual dividend–price ratios and the equilibrium dividend–price 
ratios. The purpose of this method is that when most of the fluctuation in 
dividend–price ratios is caused by historical events, using the difference 
between the fundamental equilibrium values of the dividend–price ratio and the 
actual values of the dividend–price ratio as the explanatory variable should lead 
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to an increase in the return regression estimates. By comparing return estimates 
that use the actual dividend–price ratios as the explanatory variable, the results 
indicate that the observed return predictability in the New Zealand stock market 
is caused by historical events.  
In addition to examining the in-sample predictability, Chapter 8 examines the 
out-of-sample predictive power of dividend–price ratios. Following the 
approach of Goyal and Welch (2003), the out-of-sample forecasting power of 
dividend–price ratios is compared with the forecasting power of the sample 
means. The results show that unlike the out-of-sample tests on the U.S. data, 
which commonly report poor out-of-sample predictability for dividend–price 
ratios, dividend–price ratios have strong out-of-sample predictive power for real 
returns at short, medium and long horizons. Dividend–price ratios also show 
some good out-of-sample predictive power for excess returns at short to 
medium horizons. 
Chapter 9 investigates the predictability of dividend–price ratios down to the 
individual firm level using data from four New Zealand companies that have 
been listed continually since as far back as 1964. The results suggest that the 
predictability evidence is mixed. Future returns are highly predictable at 
different horizons for some companies. On the other hand, for other companies, 
both returns and dividend growth are predictable, or dividend growth alone is 
predictable. The mixed evidence suggests that the conclusion that return 
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predictability is the main driver of variation in the dividend–price ratios of the 
aggregate market portfolio does not apply at individual firm level. The dividend 
growth predictability disappears at the aggregate level because the predictable 
component for each individual company is diversified away when it is 
aggregated in an index portfolio (Bali et al., 2008; Vuolteenaho, 2002). 
Furthermore, the results also confirm the claim by Cochrane (2008) that 
dividend–price ratios must predict returns or dividend growth or both, and that 
there must be a fundamental relationship among expected returns, future 
dividend growth and dividend–price ratios.  
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Chapter 2 Relevant Literature 
Before the late 1980s, the predictability of stock returns was considered to be 
impossible. Although some researchers such as Ball (1978) and Rozeff (1984) 
argued that the dividend–price ratio could be used to forecast returns, their 
work did not provide strong support for return predictability. In the late 1980s, 
Fama and French (1988a) and Campbell and Shiller (1988a) published perhaps 
the two most influential papers in the return predictability literature. Their 
studies have changed the traditional view of stock return predictability towards 
the opposite direction. They found that that dividend–price ratios, in aggregate 
stock portfolios, have strong predictive power for returns, especially over long 
horizons. Since then, the return predictability of dividend–price ratios on returns 
has received a lot of attention and the topic has been re-examined extensively 
(e.g., Cochrane, 1992, 2008 and 2011b; Lettau and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2008; 
Chen, 2009; Binsbergen and Koijen, 2010). The intuitive thinking around 
dividend–price ratios and how they forecast stock returns is that stock prices are 
high relative to dividends when the expected returns are low, and vice versa. 
Therefore, dividend–price ratios vary with expected returns. Cochrane (2011a, 
Ch.20) explained that if we do not rely on any asset pricing model, 
dividend–price ratios can only move if they forecast expected future returns, if 
they forecast expected future dividend changes or if prices change only in 
response to news about their future values, a.k.a. “rational bubbles”.2 A general 
                                                             
2
Cochrane (2011a, Ch.20) provides an excellent discussion on the issue of “rational bubbles” 
12 
 
conclusion in the literature is that almost all the variation in the dividend–price 
ratio is caused by changes in return forecasting, not dividend growth forecasting 
and not “rational bubble” forecasting (summaries of this evidence can be found 
in Cochrane (2008, 2011a and 2011b), and Koijen and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2011). 
Given this significant amount of empirical evidence, the view of stock return 
predictability has changed to the opposite direction to what the efficient market 
hypothesis suggested. The hypothesis that stock returns are predictable 
(especially at long horizons) has been widely accepted and it has been called a 
“new fact in finance” by Cochrane (1999). 
However, this “new fact in finance” has also caused a lot of controversy because 
the forecasting relationship between dividend–price ratios and future stock 
returns displays some problems. The first issue is that standard tests in the 
return predictability literature are argued to be somewhat problematic. Ang and 
Bekaert (2006) argue that the standard approach in the literature (see, for 
example, Campbell and Shiller, 1988a; Campbell and Viceira, 1999; Stambaugh, 
1999), which uses univariate dividend–price ratio regressions to compute 
expected returns, may not provide accurate estimates. This is because a linear 
or a VAR system cannot fully capture the non-linear dynamics of the 
data-generating process for returns, dividend–price ratios and changes in 
dividends. Ang and Bekaert (2006) built a non-linear present value model in 
which the dividend–price ratio was a highly non-linear function of the interest 
rate, excess returns and cash-flows. They found that univariate dividend–price 
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ratio regressions provided a poor proxy for true expected returns. Their results 
also indicated that predictability generally occurred at short horizons rather 
than at long horizons. The predictive power of dividend–price ratios only 
appeared to be strong in a bivariate regression with short-term interest rates at 
short horizons. Additionally, in the bivariate regression, most of the predictive 
power came from the short-term interest rates rather than from dividend–price 
ratios. Moreover, they found that dividend–price ratios had good predictive 
power for future interest rates and dividend growth but very little predictive 
power for returns. Thus they concluded that under a non-linear present value 
model, the return predictability we see in the mainstream literature that used 
univariate linear models was simply not there, as univariate linear models of the 
expected returns were likely to fail to capture the important predictable 
components in returns.  
Valkanov (2003) demonstrated that long-horizon regressions would always 
produce statistically significant results in finite samples, whether or not there 
was a structural relationship between or among the underlying variables. To 
understand this conclusion, he explained that "in a rolling summation of series 
integrated of order zero (or I(0)), the new long-horizon variable behaves 
asymptotically as a series integrated of order one (or I(1)). Such persistent 
stochastic behaviour will be observed whenever the regressor, the regressand, or 
both are obtained by summing over a nontrivial fraction of the sample." 
(Valkanov, 2003, pg202). This rolling summation process in long-horizon 
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regressions changes the stochastic order of the variables and this causes poorly 
distributed slope estimators, t-statistics and R2 values. Based on this idea, he 
used the Functional Central Limit Theorem to examine the distributions of 
t-statistics from the long-horizon regressions that were usually used in the 
literature. He found that the t-statistics in long-horizon regressions were not 
well distributed with enough power and size. Furthermore, the ordinary least 
squares estimator was not consistent and the R2 value was not a good indicator 
of the goodness of fit under some circumstances. 
Valkanov applied his method to the U.S. data, the result of which stood in 
contrast to studies such as those of Fama and French (1988a), Campbell and 
Shiller (1988a), and Hodrick (1992). Using the whole sample period (1927–1999), 
it failed to reject the null hypothesis of return predictability at any horizon. 
Moreover, by looking at the different subsamples, the findings were consistent 
with those of Goyal and Welch (2003): the only piece of evidence of return 
predictability came from the 1946–1980 sample. Therefore, it was concluded 
that when more accurate testing methods were applied, return predictability did 
not appear to be as strong as previously suggested and therefore the results 
from long-horizon regressions should be carefully re-examined. 
In contrast to Valkanov (2003), Ferson et al.(2003) developed a framework that 
focuses on short-horizon regressions. They focused on the problems that 
spurious regression bias and data mining raise. Spurious regression bias is 
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related to the studies such as those of Yule (1926), and Granger and Newbold 
(1974). These studies argued that spurious relations may exist between the 
levels of non-stationary time series that are independent. For example, it is 
possible that a regression of one independent random variable on another 
random variable will still produce a significant coefficient. In the return 
predictability literature, the dependent variable is asset returns or excess 
returns, which are not highly persistent. Therefore, one might think that 
spurious regression bias should not be an issue. However, asset returns are 
expected returns plus unpredictable noise. If the underlying expected returns 
are persistent, spurious regression bias could potentially still be an issue 
because the unexpected noise may have a major influence on the variance of 
stock returns.  
Ferson et al.(2003) examined the results of the univariate regression in nine of 
the major predictability studies (e.g., Fama and French, 1988a; Lettauand 
Ludvigson, 2001). They found 7 of the 17 t-statistics and R2 which were 
statistically significant by the 5% criteria in those studies became insignificant 
after taking spurious bias into account. Therefore, they suggested that we 
should be careful when we use lagged instruments to model time variations in 
expected returns. When lagged instruments are used to investigate an asset 
pricing model, the spurious regression problem could lead to serious problems. 
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Data mining issue was studied for stock returns by Lo and MacKinlay (1990), 
Foster et al.(1997) and others. Ferson et al. explained that if the predictive 
variables that yield high R2 values are mined and used in the predictive 
regressions, this data-mining effect was more likely to produce the spurious 
regression problem. They indicated that many of the standard predictive 
variables in the literature were actually highly auto-correlated, which was an 
indication that they could be from a spurious mining process. Their simulation 
results also suggested that many of the predictive variables in the literature may 
be spurious as well.  
Furthermore, because dividend–price ratios are generally highly persistent, the 
correct means of statistical inference is problematic. In the predictability 
literature, standard tests usually allow the possibility of a unit root. However, 
many studies such as those of Ang and Bekaert (2006), Nelson and Kim (1993), 
Stambaugh (1999) and Valkanov (2003) pointed out that the statistical evidence 
of predictability became weaker when the tests were adjusted for the high 
persistence of dividend–price ratios. 
The second issue is that dividend–price ratios are argued to have poor 
out-of-sample forecasting power,3 as shown in Bossaerts and Hillion (1999), and 
Goyal and Welch (2003). Goyal and Welch (2003) focused on the out-of-sample 
                                                             
3
The terms “forecast” or “predict” are sometimes ambiguous in the literature. Most papers use “forecast” 
or “predict” to refer to the in-sample fit of the regressions using the whole sample. Predictions using only 
prevailing data are referred as “out-of-sample forecasts” or “out-of-sample predictions”. This thesis 
follows this convention. 
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predictability of dividend–price ratios and found that return forecasts based on 
dividend–price ratios and a number of similar variables do not work out of 
sample. They compared return forecasts at t+1 produced by estimating the 
regression using data up to t, with return forecasts that used the prevailing 
sample mean, and found that the prevailing sample mean had more 
out-of-sample predictive power than the dividend–price ratio. Bossaerts and 
Hillion (1999) examined the out-of-sample predictability of dividend–price ratios 
using international data. They constructed various models based on different 
model selection criteria, such as the Akaike Information Criterion, the Bayesian 
Information Criterion and the Focused Information Criterion, and found that 
none of the models that the selection criteria chose generated significant 
out-of-sample forecasting power. 
Return predictability seems doubtful, as there has been an increasing number of 
studies questioning the predictive power of dividend–price ratios. However, 
Cochrane (2008) argued that there are some common misunderstandings in the 
literature and most of the studies against return predictability is caused by these 
misunderstandings. He provided arguments that strongly support return 
predictability and discussed these misunderstandings in depth.  
Firstly, Cochrane (2008) argues that most studies that find no advantage to 
long-horizon regressions usually use finite horizon regression coefficients and 
direct regressions. He compared the results between finite and infinite horizon 
18 
 
regression coefficients, and concluded that long-horizon regressions have 
greater power to reject the null hypothesis of unpredictable returns, but this 
power only occurs and increases beyond the 5-year horizon for the U.S. data. 
Also, instead of using direct long-horizon regression coefficients, he used 
implied coefficients, which are first-order VAR coefficients. Introducing 
first-order VAR coefficients eliminated the uncertainty that direct regressions 
have and increased the predictive power for long-horizon regressions. 
Secondly, responding to the poor out-of-sample performance found by 
Bossaerts and Hillion (1999), and Goyal and Welch (2003), Cochrane (2008) 
explained that the correct interpretation of their findings is that regressions 
using dividend–price ratios are not very useful for making real-time forecasts, 
given the difficulty of accurately estimating the coefficients in the limited 
sample period. The poor out-of-sample forecasts do not mean that returns are 
unpredictable. Out-of-sample forecasting is not a more advanced test statistic 
that gives more convincing evidence about return predictability than the 
in-sample regression coefficients or other standard tests. He argues that “One 
can simultaneously hold the view that returns are predictable, or more 
accurately that the bulk of dividend yield movements reflect return forecasts 
rather than dividend-growth forecasts, and believe that such forecasts are not 
very useful for out-of-sample forecasting and portfolio advice, given 
uncertainties about the coefficients in our datasets.” (Cochrane 2008, pg. 1566) 
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Finally, Cochrane (2008) concluded that the focus of return predictability should 
be on the hypothesis tests, not the point estimates. While point estimates can 
be biased and remain anyone’s guess, hypothesis tests indicate the probability 
that the point estimates occur by chance if the returns are really unpredictable. 
Even if the chance of doing so is small, zero return predictability is not a very 
likely conclusion of the data in the literature. If returns really are unpredictable, 
dividend changes must be predictable in order to produce the observed 
variation in dividend–price ratios. However, empirical studies (e.g., Campbell 
and Shiller, 1988a and 1998; Campbell and Ammer, 1993; Cochrane, 2008, 
2011b; Maio and Santa-Clara, 2013) found weak evidence that variation in 
dividend–price ratios is associated with variation in dividend changes. A null 
hypothesis in which returns are unpredictable must also specify that dividend 
growth is predictable: if dividend growth and expected returns have no effect, 
what does move prices? Return predictability is not a comforting result (at least 
not yet) and all we have learnt so far is that observed return predictability 
seems to be just enough to account for the variation in dividend–price ratios. If 
both future return and future dividend growth were unpredictable, we would 
have to believe that prices are moved by “bubbles”, changing only on news 
about their future values. 
In summary, the hypothesis that stock returns can be predicted by financial 
ratios like dividend–price ratios at the aggregate level has become widely 
accepted and has caused a new wave in finance. The topic of return 
20 
 
predictability is still incomplete. There is literature questioning the standard 
statistical inference and the out-of-sample performance of the dividend–price 
ratios. However, statistical issues and poor out-of-sample performance do not 
mean we can conclude that returns are still unpredictable. Even if the standard 
return predictability tests like that of Fama and French (1988a) are statistically 
insignificant, we would have to believe that the volatility tests that won a Nobel 
Prize for Robert Shiller in 2013 are wrong. If returns are really unpredictable, 
dividend growth must be predictable in order to produce the observed variation 
in dividend–price ratios. We cannot conclude that dividend growth is 
predictable either, because the evidence that market dividend–price ratios are 
associated with subsequent dividend growth is very weak in the literature. 
Additionally, the poor out-of-sample performance does not simply mean that 
returns are unpredictable. It is not hard to believe that returns are predictable 
and such predictions are not very useful for making real-time trading decisions.   
A large number of empirical studies on stock return predictability using 
dividend–price ratios are based on the U.S. data. International evidence on this 
topic is relatively weak, especially New Zealand evidence. Raj and Thurston 
(1995) is probably the only paper that checked the predictive power of 
dividend–price ratios in the New Zealand stock market. However, the sample 
size was considerably small (monthly data from 1980 to 1993). Therefore, one of 
the main aims of this research is to bridge this gap and investigate the predictive 
power of dividend–price ratios in the New Zealand stock market using a much 
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bigger sample and more robust methods. 
  
22 
 
Chapter 3 Theory and Empirical Methods 
3.1 Theory 
Campbell and Shiller (1988a) developed a return approximation that related 
current price to future dividends and returns. This approximation is as follows: 
 1 =  1 + 𝑅𝑡+1 
−1 1 + 𝑅𝑡+1 =  1 + 𝑅𝑡+1 
−1 𝑃𝑡+1+𝐷𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡
, 
where 𝑅𝑡 , 𝑃𝑡  and 𝐷𝑡  are the stock return, price and dividend growth at time 𝑡, 
respectively. 
If we multiply both sides by 
Pt
Dt
, then the inverted dividend-price ratio can be 
written as: 
 
Pt
Dt
=  1 + Rt+1 
−1 Dt+1
Dt
 (1 +
Pt+1
Dt+1
 ) . 
Taking logs, with lowercase letters denoting the logs of uppercase letters, the 
log of the dividend–price ratio can be expressed as: 
 ln  
𝐷𝑡
𝑃𝑡
 =  𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡+1 − ∆𝑑𝑡+1 − ln(1 + 𝑒
𝑝𝑡+1−𝑑𝑡+1 ), 
where 𝑟𝑡  is the continuously compounded stock return over period t and 
∆𝑑𝑡+1  is the dividend growth (∆𝑑𝑡+1 = 𝑑𝑡+1 − 𝑑𝑡  ). We can approximate the 
last term of above equation with the first-order Taylor expansion with 
P/D     = 𝑒𝑝−𝑑       as follows: 
 ln 1 + 𝑒𝑝𝑡+1−𝑑𝑡+1 ≈ ln(1 + P/D     ) +
P/D      
1+P/D      
[(𝑝𝑡+1 − 𝑑𝑡+1) − (𝑝 − 𝑑       )]. 
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Let 𝑘 = ln(1 + P/D     ) −
P/D      
1+P/D      
(𝑝 − 𝑑       )and 𝜌 =
𝑒𝐸(𝑝−𝑑)
1+𝑒𝐸(𝑝−𝑑)
,. Therefore, the log of 
the dividend–price ratio can be approximated as: 
 𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 ≈ 𝑟𝑡+1 − ∆𝑑𝑡+1 − 𝑘 +  𝜌(𝑑𝑡+1 − 𝑝𝑡+1).      (1) 
Equation (1) is the Campbell and Shiller (1998a) approximate present value 
identity. Solving Equation (1) forward, the approximate present value identity is 
expressed as: 
𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 ≈ −𝑐 +  𝜌
𝑗−1𝑘
𝑗=1  𝑟𝑡+𝑗 − ∆𝑑𝑡+𝑗  + lim𝑗→∞ 𝜌
𝑗 ( 𝑑𝑡+𝑗 − 𝑝𝑡+𝑗 ).  (2) 
Equation (2) implies that: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 ≈ 𝑐𝑜𝑣  𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 ,  𝜌
𝑗−1
𝑘
𝑗=1
𝑟𝑡+𝑗  − 𝑐𝑜𝑣  𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 ,  𝜌
𝑗−1
𝑘
𝑗=1
∆𝑑𝑡+𝑗  
   +𝜌𝑘𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 , 𝑑𝑡+𝑘 − 𝑝𝑡+𝑘 .        (3) 
Equation (3) says that dividend–price ratios can only vary if they predict future 
returns, if they predict future dividend growth or if prices grow forever 
("rational bubbles"). Dividing both sides of Equation (3) by 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 , we 
have: 
       1 ≈ 𝑏𝑟
𝑘 − 𝑏∆𝑑
𝑘 + 𝜌𝑘𝑏𝑑−𝑝
𝑘 ,      (4)  
where 𝑏𝑟
𝑘  is the coefficient from a regression of weighted k-period future 
returns ( 𝜌𝑗−1𝑘𝑗=1 𝑟𝑡+𝑗 ) on the current log dividend–price ratio (𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡); 
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𝑏∆𝑑
𝑘  and 𝑏𝑑−𝑝
𝑘  are defined similarly. 𝑏𝑟
𝑘 , 𝑏∆𝑑
𝑘  and 𝜌𝑘𝑏𝑑−𝑝
𝑘  can be read as the 
fractions of dividend–price variation attributed to time-varying expected returns, 
time varying expected dividend growth and dividend–price ratio persistence 
(“rational bubbles”). 
3.2 Empirical Methods 
To examine the predictive power of dividend–price ratios in the New Zealand 
stock market, I have implemented the method introduced by Cochrane (2008), 
which uses both the direct approach and the first-order VAR approach. The 
difference between the two methods is that the long-horizon coefficients for the 
direct regressions might differ from the implied VAR coefficients when the 
first-order VAR model does not adequately capture a multi-period 
data-generating process for returns, dividend growth and dividend–price ratios. 
For example, if there is a shock in the current dividend yield and this shock has a 
long-lasting effect on future returns or dividend growth, the direct approach 
might give more correct estimates of the long-horizon coefficients than the 
first-order VAR approach. This is because the first-order VAR model might fail to 
capture the long-lasting effect due to the restrictions imposed in the model. On 
the other hand, the first-order VAR approach might have better finite sample 
properties and thus it gives higher power against the null hypothesis of no 
predictability. In short, as in Maio and Santa-Clara (2013) argued, there might be 
a trade-off between the two approaches. 
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The direct approach estimates below several regressions: the future log real 
returns and log dividend growth on the current dividend–price ratio at different 
time horizons, k: 
    𝑟𝑡+𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1 = 𝑐𝑟 + 𝑏𝑟
𝑘 𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+𝑘
𝑟 ;       (5)           
    ∆𝑑𝑡+𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1  = 𝑐𝑑 + 𝑏𝑑
𝑘 𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+𝑘
𝑑 ;      (6)
    𝜌𝑗−1𝑘𝑗=1 𝑟𝑡+𝑗 = 𝑐𝑟𝑤 + 𝑏𝑟𝑤
𝑘  𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+𝑘
𝑟𝑤 ;     (7)
    𝜌𝑗−1𝑘𝑗=1 ∆𝑑𝑡+𝑗 = 𝑐𝑑𝑤 + 𝑏𝑑𝑤
𝑘  𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+𝑘
𝑑𝑤  .    (8) 
In Equations (5) and (6), returns are unweighted, but in Equations (7) and (8), 
returns are weighted.4  𝑟𝑡+𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1  and  ∆𝑑𝑡+𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1  denote the unweighted sum 
of single-period log real returns and log real dividend growth from period t to 
t+k;  𝜌𝑗−1𝑘𝑗=1 𝑟𝑡+𝑗  and  𝜌
𝑗−1𝑘
𝑗=1 ∆𝑑𝑡+𝑗  denote the weighted sum of 
single-period log real returns and log real dividend growth from period t to t+ k 
(with a constant approximation of weighted 𝜌 =
𝑒𝐸(𝑝−𝑑)
1+𝑒𝐸(𝑝−𝑑)
=0.949 in the data). 
For the horizon k of above 1 year, the use of overlapping data means the error 
terms to have a moving average structure of k-1. Therefore, the Newey–West 
adjusted standard errors with k-1 lags are used to produce more accurate test 
statistics. Although there are various methods to calculate standard errors in the 
literature, the Newey–West adjusted and Hodrick standard errors are the most 
                                                             
4
Many studies in the literature use unweighted returns and dividend growth when examining the predictive 
power of the dividend–price ratio for simplicity reasons. But according to the approximate present value 
identity in Equation (1), 𝑟𝑡+𝑗  and ∆𝑑𝑡+𝑗  should be weighted by 𝜌
𝑗−1. This research reports the results 
using both weighted and unweighted returns and dividend growth.  
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widely used. However, there is no clear evidence as to which is superior to the 
other. To make the results simple to understand and easy to discuss, this thesis 
only reports the Newey–West adjusted standard errors (NW standard errors). 
The VAR approach uses first-order VAR representations of log real returns, log 
real dividend growth, and log dividend–price ratio persistence. If we consider 
regressions of weighted returns and dividend growth on the dividend–price ratio, 
the first-order VAR system can be written as: 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝑐𝑟𝑤 + 𝑏𝑟𝑤  𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1
𝑟𝑤 ;        (9) 
∆𝑑𝑡+1 = 𝑐𝑑𝑤 + 𝑏𝑑𝑤  𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1
𝑑𝑤 ;          (10) 
   𝑑𝑡+1 − 𝑝𝑡+1 = 𝑐𝑑−𝑝 + 𝑏𝑑−𝑝 𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1
𝑑−𝑝 .        (11) 
Equations (9) and (10) are the return and dividend growth regressions. They are 
equivalent to Equations(5) to (8) for k=1. In other words, regression Equations(5) 
to (10) produce the same results for the 1-year regressions. 
The implied long-horizon weighted coefficients for returns, dividend growth and 
the dividend–price ratio can be calculated from VAR system above as:5 
𝑏𝑖
𝑘 =  𝜌𝑗−1∅𝑗−1
𝑘
𝑗=1
𝑏𝑖 = 𝑏𝑖
1 −  𝜌∅ 𝑘
1 − 𝜌∅
 
                𝑏𝑑−𝑝
𝑘 =  𝜌∅ 𝑘 , 
where 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑤 , 𝑑𝑤 .  and 𝑏𝑑−𝑝
𝑘  is the long-horizon weighted coefficients for the 
dividend–price ratio, and ∅ = 𝑏𝑑−𝑝
1  is the log dividend–price ratio 
                                                             
5
For the details of how the long-horizon coefficients are derived from short-horizon coefficients, please see 
Cochrane (2008). For a even better version of this, please see Cochrane (2014). 
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autocorrelation (estimated to be ∅ ≈0.81 in the data). 
When k approaches infinity, the long-run weighted coefficients can be written as 
𝑏𝑖 ,𝑘 =
𝑏𝑖
1−𝜌∅
. 
Similarly, the implied long-run unweighted coefficients can be calculated as: 
𝑏𝑖
𝑘 =  ∅𝑗−1
𝑘
𝑗=1
𝑏𝑖 = 𝑏𝑖
1 − ∅𝑘
1 − ∅
 
𝑏𝑑−𝑝
𝑘 = ∅𝑘  
and the long-run unweighted coefficient is 𝑏𝑖 ,𝑘 =
𝑏𝑖
1−∅
. 
In the infinite horizon decomposition, all the variation in the current 
dividend–price ratio is associated with either return or dividend growth because 
the predictability of the future dividend–price ratio vanishes out for a very long 
horizon: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 ≈ 𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 ,  𝜌
𝑗−1𝑘
𝑗=1 𝑟𝑡+𝑗   − 𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 ,  𝜌
𝑗−1𝑘
𝑗=1 ∆𝑑𝑡+𝑗  , 
therefore 1 = 𝑏𝑟
∞ − 𝑏𝑑
∞ .  
The t-statistics of the implied long-run coefficients are calculated based on the 
standard error of the single-period VAR coefficients using the Delta method (see 
Appendix A for details). 
3.3 Excess Return Predictability 
This research also assesses the predictive power of excess returns as the 
aggregate equity premium has also been the focus of the predictability research. 
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To investigate the excess return predictability, let 𝑟𝑡+𝑗 = 𝑟𝑓𝑡+𝑗 + 𝑟𝑝𝑡+𝑗 ; ,where 
𝑟𝑓𝑡+𝑗  and 𝑟𝑝𝑡+𝑗  are the risk-free rate and risk premium at time 𝑡 + 𝑗 . 
Therefore, the approximate present value identity can be written as: 
𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 ≈ −𝑐 +  𝜌
𝑗−1
𝑘
𝑗=1
 𝑟𝑓𝑡+𝑗 + 𝑟𝑝𝑡+𝑗 − ∆𝑑𝑡+𝑗  + 
lim
𝑗→∞
𝜌𝑗 ( 𝑑𝑡+𝑗 −  𝑝𝑡+𝑗 ) 
Rearranging the above equation, we have: 
        𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 ≈ −𝑐 +  𝜌
𝑗−1𝑘
𝑗=1 𝑟𝑝𝑡+𝑗 −  𝜌
𝑗−1𝑘
𝑗=1 (∆𝑑𝑡+𝑗 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡+𝑗 ) +
                            lim
𝑗→∞
𝜌𝑗 ( 𝑑𝑡+𝑗 −  𝑝𝑡+𝑗 ).            (12) 
The third term (( 𝜌𝑗−1𝑘𝑗=1 (∆𝑑𝑡+𝑗 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡+𝑗 )) in Equation (12) can be read as 
excess dividend growth. Therefore, the variance decomposition of Equation (12) 
is: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 ≈ 𝑐𝑜𝑣  𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 ,  𝜌
𝑗−1
𝑘
𝑗=1
𝑟𝑝𝑡+𝑗 
− 𝑐𝑜𝑣  𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 ,  𝜌
𝑗−1
𝑘
𝑗=1
∆𝑒𝑑𝑡+𝑗  
       +𝜌𝑘𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 , 𝑑𝑡+𝑘 − 𝑝𝑡+𝑘 .       (13) 
Notice that in Equation (13), excess return predictability is associated with 
excess dividend growth predictability. Therefore, we can also examine the 
predictive power for excess returns and excess dividend growth using the direct 
approach and the VAR approach discussed in Section 3.2 (by replacing return 
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and dividend growth in Equations (5)–(10) with excess return and excess 
dividend growth). 
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Chapter 4 Data 
Annual observations of the value-weighted New Zealand stock index from 1931 
to 2012 are used in this research. Annual data on stock market returns, bond 
yields, dividend–price ratios and dividend growth between 1931 and 2002 come 
from Lally and Marsden (2004), and were generously provided by Martin Lally. 
The rest of the stock market data are updated to 2012 using the information 
available from the NZX Company Research database;6 bond and inflation data 
have been taken from the Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s database.7 A more 
detailed description of the construction of the data series is contained in 
Appendix B. 
Instead of using the total bond returns, the annual actual bond yields are used 
as a proxy for the riskless rates. This is because of restrictions on the data: only 
10-year New Zealand government bond data were available for this study.8 The 
bond yields measure the holding period return if the bond is held to its maturity. 
Note that the bond yield for each year will be different from the actual bond 
return for each year, as bond returns change with changes in prices and coupons 
paid during the holding period.  
However, the bond yields may not be an accurate measure of the riskless rate 
because yields might change for each holding period before the maturity date. 
                                                             
6
Available athttp://companyresearch.nzx.com/crust/services.php 
7
Available athttp://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/tables/b2/ 
8
The 10-year bond is the only New Zealand government bond to exist for the entire 1931–2012 period. 
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This leads to a reinvestment risk on the coupon payments. Therefore, this proxy 
of riskless rates is very likely to be higher than true riskless rates.  
When calculating excess returns, 1-year excess returns are calculated as the 
stock return of the year less the beginning-of-the-year yield of the 10-year 
government bond: 𝑒𝑟𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡 , where 𝑒𝑟𝑡  and 𝑟𝑡  are the excess returns and 
the actual stock returns, respectively, in year t; 𝑦𝑡  is the bond yield at the 
beginning of year 𝑡. 
The excess return proxy is likely to be noisy when the beginning-of-the-year 
yield of the 10-year government bond is used. For this reason, I will consider 
another method, which calculates the excess return series under the 
assumption that the 10-year government bond is identical to a perpetuity. To be 
more specific, let the bond return between 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1 be 𝑦𝑡 +
𝑦𝑡−𝑦𝑡+1
𝑦𝑡
, where 
𝑦𝑡  is the bond yield at the beginning of year 𝑡. The excess returns are then 
calculated as 𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡 +
𝑦𝑡−𝑦𝑡+1
𝑦𝑡
. 
Table 1 below shows the descriptive statistics for the series. The average of log 
real return and log excess return are 4.7%, and 3.3% or 3.8% (depending on 
which method is used to calculate excess returns); the average dividend-price 
ratio is 5.5%. By comparison, the averages of real return, excess return and 
dividend yield for the New Zealand market calculated by Lally and Marsden 
(2004) for the period 1931–2002 are 4.7%, 2.9% and 5.1%, respectively. 
However, the periods studied are different. Dividend growth is about –1% on 
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average and it is almost as variable as returns (or excess returns) in the sample 
period. Compared to the U.S. historical average, New Zealand’s real return, 
excess return and dividend growth are higher, but dividend yield is lower. The 
historical average of real return, excess return, dividend growth and dividend 
yield in the U.S. are 7.4%, 4.9%, 4% and 3.6%, respectively.9 
 
Table 1:Descriptive Statistics for the full sample (1931–2012) 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max Number of 
positive 
observations  
Number of 
negative 
observations  
𝑟 
0.047  0.205  -0.756  0.750  54 27 
𝑒𝑟 
0.033  0.201  -0.817  0.665  50 31 
𝑒𝑟𝑝 
0.038  0.218  -0.855  0.621  47 34 
∆𝑑 
-0.010  0.172  -0.589  0.722  39 42 
𝐷𝑃 
0.055  0.014  0.029  0.088  81 0 
𝑟 isthe log of real annual stock index returns. 𝑒𝑟 is the log real annual excess returns assuming 
that the riskless bond 1-year return equals its beginning-of-period yield.𝑒𝑟𝑝 is the log of real 
annual excess returns assuming that the riskless bond is a perpetuity. ∆𝑑 is the annual change 
in log dividends. 𝐷𝑃 is the nominal dividend–price ratio. 
 
The time series of log real returns, log excess returns (both 𝑒𝑟 and 𝑒𝑟𝑝) and 
log real dividend growth are plotted in Figure 1a. During the sample period, real 
returns, excess returns and real dividend growth moved up and down in a 
similar fashion. The most volatile period in the data is the 1980s. Following the 
                                                             
9
Average real return and excess return figures from the U.S. have been retrieved from Ibbotson Associates 
(2006) and the sample period is 1926–2005. Average dividend growth and dividend yield figures in the U.S. 
have been retrieved from Maio and Santa-Clara (2013), and the sample period is 1928–2010.  
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international bull market which began in 1982, the New Zealand stock market 
experienced its greatest rise in history. Not surprisingly, real returns, excess 
returns and real dividend growth reached their highest values (75%, 66.5% or 
62.1% and 72.2%, respectively) in 1983. However, 4 years later, the New Zealand 
stock market suffered its biggest collapse: just one day after the dramatic fall of 
the U.S. stock market in October 19th, 1987, the New Zealand stock market 
collapsed. Real return, excess return and real dividend growth dropped to their 
lowest values in the sample (–75.6%, –81.7% or –85.5% and –58.9%, 
respectively). Furthermore, although minor differences between the two sets of 
excess return series (i.e., between er and erp) can be observed, they are 
considerably close, particularly after 1980. 
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Figure 1a: Time series of log real returns, log excess returns and log real 
dividend growth 
 
The time series of the dividend–price ratio is plotted in Figure 1b. Apart from 
the first two years (1931 and 1932), dividend–price ratios were lower in the 
early part of the sample period and slowly increased after the 1960s. The most 
volatile period was the late 1970s to the late 1980s. The dividend–price ratio 
reached its highest value of 8.8% in 1979. During the New Zealand financial 
sector reform period, the dividend–price ratio dropped from 8.1% in 1983 to 5.6% 
in 1984. In 1986, the dividend–price ratio dropped to its lowest value of 2.9%. 
After that, it slowly recovered and researched its second highest value of 8.4% in 
2004. However, during the global financial crisis in 2007, the dividend–price 
ratio dropped significantly to 4.8% and it has remained at this level since then. 
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Figure 1b: Time series of the dividend–price ratio 
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Chapter 5 Results 
To examine the predictability in the New Zealand stock market and compare the 
results with the existing research, this chapter uses the full 1931–2012 sample 
to estimate return and dividend growth coefficients under both the direct and 
VAR-implied approach for different time horizons(𝑘). Section 5.1 reports the 
weighted regression results; Section 5.2 provides the unweighted regression 
results. 
5.1 Weighted Regressions 
Table 2 reports the weighted coefficient estimates from Equations (5) and (6) 
under the direct approach for 𝑘 = 1, 3, 5, 10 and 15. From Panel A in Table 2, 
we can see that there is clear evidence of stock real return predictability for 
short (1 year), medium (3 to 5 year) and long horizons (10 year and above) in 
the New Zealand stock market. The estimates of real return predictability 
coefficients are both economically large and statistically significant for all values 
of k using the NW standard errors (discussed in Chapter 3). At the 1-year horizon, 
the direct approach suggests that expected return volatility accounts for about 
27% of the variation in the dividend–price ratio, increasing to 53%, 64% and 70% 
over 3, 5 and 10 years, respectively. At the 15-year horizon, the coefficient 
decreases to 0.67. The reason why the 15-year return coefficient falls is possibly 
due to the small sample size. As more of the overlapping data are used, the 
sample size becomes relatively small for the 15-year regressions, which can 
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potentially introduce noise to the model. The R2 values are high and they 
increase with the horizon. Increases in the coefficients and R2 values imply that 
the predictive power of the dividend–price ratio for real returns increases with 
the horizon. Compared with Cochrane’s finding (Cochrane 2008, Table 6) for real 
returns in the U.S., the direct return point estimates are about two times higher 
at 1- to 5-year horizons. For horizons above 5 years, real return point estimates 
are lower than what Cochrane found for the U.S. (20–60% lower, depending on 
the horizon). 
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Table 2: Direct weighted regressions: full sample (1931–2012) 
  
k Constant Coefficient NW 
standard 
error 
t-statistic p-value R2 
Panel A 
r 
1 0.83  0.27  0.08 3.22 0.00 0.12  
3 1.68  0.53  0.17  3.19  0.00  0.22  
5 2.09  0.64  0.20  3.28  0.00  0.22  
10 2.42  0.70  0.18  3.80  0.00  0.31  
15 2.48  0.67  0.20  3.38  0.00  0.32  
Panel B 
er 
1 0.74  0.24  0.08 2.91 0.00 0.10  
3 1.47  0.47  0.19  2.47  0.02  0.18  
5 1.73  0.54  0.26  2.06  0.04  0.15  
10 1.59  0.45  0.29  1.55  0.13  0.12  
15 1.26  0.30  0.24  1.25  0.22  0.05  
Panel C 
erp 
1 0.78  0.25  0.09 2.80 0.00 0.09  
3 1.57  0.50  0.27  1.81  0.08  0.12  
5 1.88  0.58  0.41  1.39  0.17  0.10  
10 1.38  0.34  0.58  0.58  0.57  0.02  
15 0.67  0.04  0.49  0.09  0.93  0.00  
Panel D 
∆𝑑 
1 0.09  0.03  0.07 0.46 0.65 0.00  
3 -0.26  -0.08  0.11  -0.72  0.47  0.01  
5 -0.24  -0.07  0.16  -0.42  0.68  0.00  
10 -0.66  -0.21  0.13  -1.63  0.11  0.05  
15 -0.74  -0.23  0.19  -1.25  0.22  0.06  
Panel E 
∆𝑒𝑑 
1 -0.01  0.01  0.07  0.08  0.94  0.00  
3 -0.47  -0.14  0.13  -1.05  0.30  0.03  
5 -0.60  -0.17  0.22  -0.79  0.44  0.03  
10 -1.49  -0.46  0.22  -2.12  0.04  0.17  
15 -1.95  -0.61  0.23  -2.61  0.01  0.22  
Panel F 
∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 
1 0.03  0.02  0.09  0.20  0.84  0.00  
3 -0.38  -0.12  0.23  -0.50  0.62  0.01  
5 -0.44  -0.13  0.37  -0.36  0.72  0.01  
10 -1.70  -0.57  0.51  -1.12  0.27  0.07  
15 -2.55  -0.86  0.48  -1.78  0.08  0.11  
Predictability coefficient estimates for the weighted direct approach from 1931 to 2012. 𝑟 
is the log real return,𝑒𝑟 is the log excess return and 𝑒𝑟𝑝 is the log excess return assuming 
that the riskless bond is a perpetuity. ∆𝑑 is the log real dividend growth, ∆𝑒𝑑 is the log 
excess dividend growth and ∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 is the log excess dividend growth assuming that the 
riskless bond is a perpetuity.  
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Panels B and C in Table 2 show some evidence for excess return predictability. 
However, unlike Cochrane (2008), who found stronger return predictability for 
excess returns, the point estimates and R2 values for excess returns in Panels B 
and C are all smaller than their real return counterparts. Furthermore, the 
coefficients are generally insignificant at long horizons. This decrease in 
predictive power for excess returns is almost certainly due to the noise in the 
bond return series, as discussed in Chapter 4. It seems that calculating excess 
returns with the assumption that the 10-year government bond is identical to a 
perpetuity does not solve the noise in the bond return series. Even though the 
bond series is noisy, we can still see some predictive power for excess returns at 
short to medium horizons (1 to 3 years in Panels B and C). 
Panel D provides evidence to confirm that real dividend growth is not 
predictable. The real dividend growth coefficients are not statistically significant. 
Additionally, the R2 values are weak. Only the 10-year real dividend growth 
coefficient is close to being significant (p-value= 0.11) but the R2 is only 5% in 
this case. Panels E and F show that excess dividend growth is generally not 
predictable. The only exceptions are in Panel E, where dividend growth becomes 
predictable at 10-year and 15-year horizons. However, this could be due to the 
noise in the bond return series as well.  
Table 3 shows the weighted coefficient estimates from the VAR-implied 
approach for 𝑘 = 1, 3, 5, 10, 15 and ∞.In Panel A, the implied estimates for real 
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return are higher than the direct estimates. Expected real returns variation 
accounts for 27%, 63%, 84%, 107% and 112% of dividend–price ratio volatility 
for 𝑘 = 1, 3, 5, 10, and 15. At longer horizons, 115% of dividend yield volatility 
is associated with the expected real return variation. The VAR approach also 
gives larger t-statistics to real return estimates compared with the direct 
approach. When we look at excess return predictability, the VAR approach gives 
a different picture. While the direct approach suggests that excess return is not  
predictable at long horizons, the VAR approach suggests otherwise. From Panels 
B and C, we can see that excess return estimates are all economically large and 
statistically significant at all horizons. The predictive power also increases with 
the time horizon. However, the return predictability of excess returns is still not 
stronger than their real return counterparts such as Cochrane (2008) found 
under the VAR approach. This could still be due to the noise in the bond return 
series. In Panels D, E and F, we can see that real and excess dividend growth are 
nowhere near being predictable under the VAR approach. The coefficients are 
all very small with incorrect signs and are also statistically insignificant. 
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Table 3: VAR-implied weighted regressions: full sample (1931–2012) 
  k Coefficient NW standard error t-statistic p-value 
Panel A 
r 
1 0.27  0.08 3.22 0.00 
3 0.63  0.18  3.53  0.00  
5 0.84  0.23  3.70  0.00  
10 1.07  0.29  3.69  0.00  
15 1.12  0.31  3.58  0.00  
∞ 1.15  0.33  3.42  0.00  
Panel B 
er 
1 0.24  0.08 2.91 0.00 
3 0.56  0.18  3.17  0.00  
5 0.75  0.23  3.31  0.00  
10 0.95  0.28  3.36  0.00  
15 1.01  0.31  3.29  0.00  
∞ 1.02  0.32  3.19  0.00  
Panel C 
erp 
1 0.25  0.09 2.80 0.00 
3 0.59  0.20  2.97  0.00  
5 0.79  0.26  3.04  0.00  
10 1.00  0.33  3.00  0.00  
15 1.06  0.36  2.92  0.00  
∞ 1.08  0.38  2.82  0.01  
Panel D 
∆𝑑 
 
1 0.03  0.07 0.46 0.65 
3 0.08  0.18  0.46  0.65  
5 0.11  0.24  0.45  0.65  
10 0.14  0.30  0.45  0.66  
15 0.14  0.32  0.44  0.66  
∞ 0.15  0.33  0.44  0.66  
Panel E 
∆𝑒𝑑 
 
1 0.01  0.07  0.08  0.94  
3 0.01  0.17  0.08  0.94  
5 0.02  0.23  0.08  0.94  
10 0.02  0.29  0.08  0.94  
15 0.02  0.31  0.08  0.94  
∞ 0.02  0.32  0.08  0.94  
Panel F 
∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 
1 0.02  0.09  0.20  0.84  
3 0.04  0.20  0.20  0.84  
5 0.06  0.27  0.20  0.84  
10 0.07  0.35  0.20  0.84  
15 0.07  0.37  0.20  0.84  
∞ 0.08  0.38  0.20  0.84  
Predictability coefficient estimates for the weighted VAR approach from 1931 to2012. 𝑟 is 
the log real return,𝑒𝑟 is the log excess return and 𝑒𝑟𝑝 is the log excess return assuming 
that the riskless bond is a perpetuity. ∆𝑑 is the log real dividend growth, ∆𝑒𝑑 is the log 
excess dividend growth and ∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 is the log excess dividend growth assuming that the 
riskless bond is a perpetuity. 
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By comparing Tables 2 and 3, we see that the results are relatively similar in the 
sense that under both the direct and VAR-implied approaches, expected return 
variation accounts for most of the dividend–price ratio volatility, and expected 
dividend growth variation accounts for almost no dividend–price ratio volatility. 
In other words, return predictability is the main driver of the variation in the 
dividend–price ratios in the New Zealand stock market, not dividend growth 
predictability. 
5.2 Unweighted regression 
Tables 4 and 5 report the unweighted regression results. By comparing Tables 2 
and 3 to Tables 4 and 5, we can see that the main conclusions are insensitive to 
the choice between weighted and unweighted regressions. Since the weight 
𝜌 = 0.949, which is close to 1 in the New Zealand data, this conclusion is not 
surprising. However, direct weighted return and excess return regressions 
produce higher t-statistics and R2 values compared with unweighted regressions 
in most cases. The implied weighted return and excess return regressions also 
produce higher t-statistics at long horizons compared with the unweighted 
regressions. This suggests that weighted regressions seem to have a little more 
power to detect predictability. 
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Table 4: Direct unweighted regressions: full sample (1931–2012) 
 
  
k Constant Coefficient NW standard 
error 
t-statistic p-value  R2 
Panel 
A 
r 
1 0.83  0.27  0.08  3.22  0.00  0.12  
3 1.75  0.55  0.17  3.17  0.00  0.21  
5 2.23  0.68  0.21  3.21  0.00  0.21  
10 2.55  0.71  0.24  3.01  0.00  0.22  
15 2.62  0.65  0.25  2.59  0.00  0.18  
Panel B 
er 
1 0.74  0.24  0.08  2.91  0.00  0.10  
3 1.53  0.49  0.20  2.46  0.02  0.17  
5 1.83  0.57  0.29  1.99  0.05  0.14  
10 1.47  0.38  0.33  1.15  0.26  0.06  
15 0.71  0.07  0.25  0.27  0.79  0.00  
Panel C 
erp 
1 0.78  0.25  0.09  2.80  0.00  0.09  
3 1.63  0.51  0.29  1.78  0.08  0.12  
5 2.00  0.61  0.45  1.34  0.18  0.09  
10 1.04  0.19  0.67  0.29  0.78  0.00  
15 -0.58  -0.45  0.48  -0.94  0.35  0.02  
Panel 
D 
∆𝑑 
1 0.09  0.03  0.07  0.46  0.65  0.00  
3 -0.28  -0.09  0.12  -0.74  0.46  0.01  
5 -0.26  -0.07  0.18  -0.40  0.69  0.00  
10 0.07  -0.31  0.16  -1.94  0.06  0.07  
15 -0.12  -0.38  0.30  -1.27  0.21  0.08  
Panel E 
∆𝑒𝑑 
1 -0.01  0.01  0.07  0.08  0.94  0.00  
3 -0.51  -0.15  0.14  -1.07  0.29  0.03  
5 -0.66  -0.19  0.24  -0.77  0.44  0.03  
10 -2.13  -0.66  0.26  -2.59  0.01  0.22  
15 -3.11  -0.97  0.30  -3.25  0.00  0.28  
Panel F 
∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 
1 0.03  0.02  0.09  0.20  0.84  0.00  
3 -0.41  -0.13  0.24  -0.52  0.60  0.01  
5 -0.49  -0.15  0.41  -0.36  0.72  0.01  
10 -2.55  -0.85  0.59  -1.44  0.15  0.10  
15 -4.41  -1.49  0.54  -2.76  0.01  0.17  
Predictability coefficient estimates for the direct unweighted approach from 1931 to 2012. 𝑟 is the log real 
return, 𝑒𝑟 is the log excess return and 𝑒𝑟𝑝 is the log excess return assuming that the riskless bond is a 
perpetuity. ∆𝑑 is the log real dividend growth, ∆𝑒𝑑 is the log excess dividend growth and ∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 is the 
log excess dividend growth assuming that the riskless bond is a perpetuity. 
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Table 5: VAR-implied unweighted regressions: full sample (1931–2012) 
 
k Coefficient NW Standard error t-statistic p-value 
Panel 
A 
r 
1 0.27  0.08  3.22 0.00  
3 0.66  0.19  3.55  0.00  
5 0.91  0.25  3.71  0.00  
10 1.23  0.34  3.62  0.00  
15 1.33  0.39  3.38  0.00  
∞ 1.39  0.45  3.12  0.00  
Panel 
B 
er 
1 0.24  0.08  2.91  0.00  
3 0.59  0.19  3.18  0.00  
5 0.82  0.25  3.33  0.00  
10 1.10  0.33  3.32  0.00  
15 1.19  0.38  3.16  0.00  
∞ 1.24  0.42  2.97  0.00  
Panel 
C 
erp 
1 0.25  0.09  2.80  0.00  
3 0.62  0.21  2.98  0.00  
5 0.86  0.28  3.05  0.00  
10 1.15  0.39  2.94  0.00  
15 1.25  0.45  2.79  0.01  
∞ 1.31  0.50  2.62  0.01  
Panel 
D 
∆𝑑 
 
1 0.03  0.07  0.46  0.65  
3 0.08  0.18  0.46  0.65  
5 0.12  0.26  0.45  0.65  
10 0.16  0.35  0.45  0.66  
15 0.17  0.38  0.44  0.66  
∞ 0.18  0.40  0.44  0.66  
Panel 
E 
∆𝑒𝑑 
 
1 0.01  0.07  0.08  0.94  
3 0.01  0.18  0.08  0.94  
5 0.02  0.25  0.08  0.94  
10 0.03  0.34  0.08  0.94  
15 0.03  0.37  0.08  0.94  
∞ 0.03  0.38  0.08  0.94  
Panel 
F 
∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 
1 0.02  0.09  0.20  0.84  
3 0.04  0.21  0.20  0.84  
5 0.06  0.30  0.20  0.84  
10 0.08  0.40  0.20  0.84  
15 0.09  0.44  0.20  0.84  
∞ 0.09  0.46  0.20  0.84  
Predictability coefficient estimates for the weighted VAR approach from 1931 to 2012. 𝑟 is 
the log real return,𝑒𝑟 is the log excess return and 𝑒𝑟𝑝 is the log excess return assuming 
that the riskless bond is a perpetuity. ∆𝑑 is the log real dividend growth, ∆𝑒𝑑 is the log 
excess dividend growth and ∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 is the log excess dividend growth assuming that the 
riskless bond is a perpetuity. 
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Chapter 6 Risk-pricing or Mispricing? 
In the previous chapter, I have found New Zealand evidence that the 
dividend–price ratio has strong predictive power for future returns. However, is 
this observed predictive power associated with risk-pricing or mispricing? On 
one hand, a high dividend–price ratio may be a signal of high future risk. 
Therefore, the expected returns have to be adjusted to match up with the high 
future risk. As a result, any subsequent average returns will also be high and this 
produces the predictability we see. On the other hand, a high dividend–price 
ratio could also mean that stock prices are low relative to their intrinsic values. 
As investors realise that stocks are mispriced, prices will increase and therefore, 
the subsequent returns will be high.  
The New Zealand stock market provides a good background to allow me to test 
whether the return predictability is associated with risk-pricing or mispricing. 
Before July 1984, the New Zealand stock market was considered to be highly 
regulated. For example, the exchange rate was fixed and entry to the foreign 
exchange market was very difficult: private overseas borrowing, foreign-owned 
companies, access to domestic financial markets and the ability of New Zealand 
residents to buy foreign exchange for investment purposes were all highly 
restricted. There were also many restrictions on financial institutions, such as 
official and unofficial short-term money market dealers, finance and trust 
companies, stock agents and private mortgage lenders. All these restricted 
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information being incorporated in stock prices; therefore, the degree of 
mispricing in the pre-reform period seems to be considerably high. Groenewold 
(1997) reports evidence that supports this idea (although this evidence is not 
very strong). 
Since July 1984, liberalisation has helped the New Zealand financial market 
become an extremely open market with a few distortions and open entry. The 
exchange rate has been floated; the foreign exchange trading restrictions have 
been removed; borrowing and lending have become much easier because of the 
removal of liquidity ratios on all financial institutions; the interest rate, which 
was fully regulated, has become market-determined; and the entry and exit of 
banks have become free. After market liberalisation, the information can be 
more easily incorporated into stock prices; therefore the degree of mispricing 
seems to be low in the post-reform period.  
If mispricing is the main driver of the observed predictability in New Zealand, 
then we should see a stronger relationship between dividend–price ratios and 
future stock returns in the pre-reform period because the degree of mispricing is 
considerably high. We should also see a weaker relationship in the post-reform 
period, as the mispricing opportunities would seem to be less. On the other 
hand, if risk-pricing is the main driver of the observed predictability, any change 
that increases or decreases mispricing would have no effect on the relationship 
between dividend-price ratios and future stock returns. In other words, the 
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relationship between dividend-price ratios and future stock returns would be 
about the same in the pre-reform and post-reform periods. 
To explain the risk-pricing and mispricing hypotheses more clearly in 
mathematical terms, let 𝑏𝑟
𝑘  denote the return predictability, and 𝑟  and 𝑧 
denote the expected return associated with the risk-pricing and mispricing 
components respectively. Now 𝑏𝑟
𝑘 = 𝑏𝑟 
𝑘 + 𝑏𝑧
𝑘  (i.e., the return predictability is 
due to risk-pricing (𝑏𝑟 
𝑘)  or mispricing (𝑏𝑧
𝑘)) . If we hypothesise that the 
predictability is primarily due to mispricing, then we would expect a fall in 𝑏𝑧
𝑘  
in the post-reform period, as mispricing was significantly reduced in this period. 
As a result, 𝑏𝑟
𝑘  will also fall. If we form a similar hypothesis about risk-pricing, a 
reduction in mispricing opportunities will not have any effect on 𝑏𝑟 
𝑘 . Therefore, 
𝑏𝑟
𝑘  is expected to stay unchanged. It also could be the case that we might see a 
increase in 𝑏𝑟 
𝑘  if the reform improves risk-pricing accuracy in the New Zealand 
market, which would lead to an increase in 𝑏𝑟
𝑘 .  
To examine whether the observed return predictability is due to mispricing or 
risk-pricing, I compare the estimates of 𝑏𝑟
𝑘  from 1931–1984 and those from 
1985–2012. For simplicity reasons, this chapter only reports the weighted 
regression for both the direct and VAR approach, as both the weighted and 
unweighted regressions give the same conclusions as those shown in Chapter 5. 
Furthermore, the results for direct regressions beyond a 5-year horizon are not 
reported because the sample size becomes very small for the post-reform 
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period (18 observations for the 10-year regression; there are not enough 
observations to run the 15-year regressions). 
If the observed predictability in the New Zealand stock market is primarily 
associated with mispricing, we should see a fall in the return coefficients in the 
post-reform sample. However, In Table 6, we can see this is not the case. At all 
horizons, the return and excess return coefficients are greater in the post-reform 
sample. Also, there are some cases where the post-reform coefficients are 
greater than the pre-reform coefficients at the 0.05 significance level following 
the Welch t-tests (Welch, 1947). In some cases, the post-reform coefficients are 
close to being significantly greater than the pre-reform coefficients. However, 
because there are only a small number of observations in the post-reform 
sample, this means that the Welch t-tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
there being no difference between the post-reform and pre-reform coefficients. 
The post-reform real and excess return coefficients are about two times larger 
than the pre-reform coefficients at 1-year to 3-year horizons; at a 5-year horizon, 
they are still 60%–70% larger. The difference only becomes small in the long run.  
It is important to rule out the possibility that the increase in predictability began 
prior to 1984. To test this, I first divide the 1931–1984 data into two sub-periods 
and compare the return coefficients between these sub-periods. The first 
sub-period is 1931–1950 (20 observations) and the second sub-period is 
1951–1984 (34 observations). Welch's t-test is then used to test whether the 
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coefficient of the second sub-period is significantly greater than the coefficient 
of the first sub-period. Next, I continue to roll the first sub-period forward 1 year 
at a time until there are only 20 observations for the second sub-period. For 
example, the coefficient of 1931–1950 is compared with the coefficient of 
1951–1984, then 1931–1951 with 1952–1984, through to a comparison of 
1931–1964 with 1965–1984. The results (in Appendix C) show that the increase 
in return predictability does not occur prior to 1984. For real returns, the 
Welch's t-tests reject the null hypothesis of greater coefficients in the second 
sub-period at 1-, 3- and 5-year horizons for most cases. For excess returns, the 
results suggest that there is no significant difference between the two 
sub-periods in all cases. 
Based on the mispricing hypothesis, we should see weaker return predictability 
in the post-reform sample. However, instead of weaker return predictability, we 
see that the return predictability is much stronger in the post-reform period. 
This suggests that the return predictability in the New Zealand stock market is 
not due to mispricing. If the return predictability is really due to mispricing, 
market liberalisation must have resulted in more mispricing and arbitrage 
opportunities in the market, or else market liberalisation has led to less 
mispricing and arbitrage opportunities, although this has created a 
longer-lasting mispricing. Both of these arguments are very unconvincing.  
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Table 6: Weighted regressions: 1931–1984 sample vs.1985–2012 sample 
1931-1984 pre-reform sample 
 
 
k Coefficient NW standard  
error 
t-stats p-value  R2 
Panel A       
𝑟 
1 0.23 0.09 2.7 0.01 0.13 
3 0.50 (0.56)  0.21 (0.19) 2.41 (3.04)  0.02 (0.00) 0.21 
5 0.63 (0.77) 0.21 (0.24) 3.07 (3.25) 0.00 (0.00) 0.23 
∞ (1.11) (0.34) (3.10) (0.00) – 
Panel B 
      
𝑒𝑟 
1 0.23 0.08 3.05 0.00 0.15 
3 0.51(0.56) 0.16(0.17) 3.19(3.38) 0.00(0.00) 0.32 
5 0.61(0.76) 0.19(0.22) 3.26(3.55) 0.00(0.00) 0.29 
∞  (1.10)  (0.36)  (3.02)  (0.00) – 
Panel C  
     
𝑒𝑟𝑝 
1 0.30 0.08 3.59 0.00 0.20 
3 0.67(0.72) 0.21(0.18) 3.20(4.11) 0.00(0.00) 0.35 
5 0.78(0.98) 0.28(0.23) 2.81(3.36) 0.01(0.00) 0.31 
∞  (1.42)  (0.42)  (3.39)  (0.00) – 
 
1985–2012 post-reform sample 
 
 
k Coefficient NW standard error t-stats p-value  R2 
Panel E       
𝑟 
1 0.50 0.21 2.43 0.02 0.19 
3 1.01* (1.01) 0.18 (0.38) 5.58 (2.62)  0.00 (0.01) 0.48 
5 1.08 (1.20) 0.31 (0.47) 3.54 (2.54) 0.00 (0.01) 0.41 
∞ (1.32) (0.59) (2.24) (0.03) – 
Panel F 
      
𝑒𝑟 
1 0.50 0.21 2.39 0.02 0.15 
3 1.07*(1.01) 0.18(0.39) 5.87(2.61) 0.00(0.01) 0.51 
5 1.25*(1.21) 0.31 (0.47) 4.06(2.55) 0.00(0.01) 0.50 
∞  (1.33)  (0.59)  (2.27)  (0.03)  – 
Panel G  
     
𝑒𝑟𝑝 
1 0.54 0.21 2.64 0.01 0.20 
3 1.17*(1.08) 0.18(0.38) 6.42(2.83) 0.00(0.01) 0.51 
5 1.60*(1.29) 0.29(0.48) 5.50(2.70) 0.00(0.01) 0.59 
∞  (1.43)  (0.61)  (2.33)  (0.02)  – 
Predictability coefficient estimates are for both the direct approach and the VAR approach for the 
1931–1984 and 1985–2004 samples. Weight,𝜌=0.952; dividend–price ratio persistence for the 1931–1984 
sample, ∅ = 0.828 . Weight, 𝜌 =0.944; dividend–price ratio persistence for the 1985–2012 sample, 
∅ = 0.657.Numbers not in parentheses are estimates associated with the direct approach; numbers in 
parentheses are estimates associated with the VAR approach.𝑟 is the log real return,𝑒𝑟 is the log excess 
return and 𝑒𝑟𝑝 is the log excess return assuming that the riskless bond is a perpetuity.* indicates that the 
post-reform coefficient is greater than the pre-reform coefficient at the 0.05 significance level or better, 
based on Welch’s t-test (Welch, 1947). 
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One major potential cause of the increase in return predictability in the 
post-reform period may be the result of the small sample size. The outlier effect 
will thus have a strong impact on the estimates in a small sample. There are two 
major financial crises within the post-reform sample: the Black Monday Crisis of 
1987 and the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. When more data become available, 
we may see a fall in return predictability for the post-reform period, as the 
outlier effect will be reduced by an increase in the sample size. 
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Chapter 7 Fundamental Relationship or Historical Events? 
Is the observed return predictability in New Zealand due to the fundamental 
relationship between the dividend–price ratio and future returns? Or is it due to 
something else? Cornell (2013) argues that there are two different ways to 
interpret return predictability evidence in the literature. The first interpretation 
is that the return predictability we see is due to the fundamental relationship 
between the dividend–price ratio and future returns. The second interpretation 
argues that this return predictability (mainly coming from the U.S. data) may be 
caused by a combination of different historical events. He indicates that when 
events such as the Great Depression, World War II, the Nifty-Fifty Stock Market 
Boom and the Dot-Com Bubble happened, investors would forecast the long-run 
impact of the events on dividend growth. However, the fact is that the real 
dividend growth rate (about 3.4% per annum) has almost never changed in the 
U.S. for almost over a century. When investors forecasted a higher or lower real 
dividend growth rate, they turned out to be wrong. When they realised their 
mistakes, prices had to adjust to bring dividend–price ratios back to match the 
revised expectations. This produced a correlation between the dividend–price 
ratio and subsequent returns. It might be the case that the return predictability 
we see in the U.S. is caused by this adjustment. In other words, investors have 
wrongly forecasted the long-run dividend growth and this caused dividend–price 
ratios to differ from their equilibrium values. Therefore, prices have had to 
adjust to bring the dividend–price ratios back to their equilibrium values. This 
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interpretation seems to imply that investors were irrational and every time they 
tried to predict dividend growth, they turned out to be wrong. However, Cornell 
explains that this does not necessarily mean that investors were irrational. 
When events such as the Great Depression, World War II and the Nifty-Fifty 
Stock Market Boom happened, investors were actually rational and tried to 
predict future dividend growth based on how they evaluated the impacts of 
each event. However, the fact is that as far as dividend growth was concerned, 
these events did not change the constant dividend growth in the U.S.  
Cornell (2013) provides a simple method to investigate the second 
interpretation. He explains that if the predictability is caused by the adjustments 
from the actual dividend–price ratios to their equilibrium values, then the 
explanatory power of return regressions such as Equations (5) and (7) discussed 
in Chapter 3 should increase if the difference between the actual and the 
equilibrium dividend–price ratio is used as the explanatory variable. He uses a 
linear trend to represent the equilibrium dividend–price ratios and finds that the 
explanatory power of return regressions has improved substantially for the U.S. 
data. However, dividend–price ratios are unrelated to future dividend growth. 
He concludes that the relationship between dividend–price ratio and future 
returns is an artefact of a certain combination of historical events in the U.S. 
This relationship produced the return predictability we see in the U.S. However, 
this relationship is unlikely to hold in the future because the unique historical 
events that happened in the past are very unlikely to repeat in the future. 
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To test whether the historical events are associated with the return 
predictability, I will follow Cornell's approach. I will use the upward trend 
(shown in Figure 2) in the New Zealand data to represent the equilibrium 
dividend–price ratios, and use the difference between the actual and the 
equilibrium dividend–price ratios as the explanatory variable. The direct 
regressions can be written as: 
   𝑟𝑡+𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1 = 𝑐𝑟 + 𝑏𝑟
𝑘 𝑑𝑡 ∗ −𝑝𝑡 ∗ + 𝜀𝑡+𝑘
𝑟 ;         (14)
   ∆𝑑𝑡+𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1  = 𝑐𝑑 + 𝑏𝑑
𝑘 𝑑𝑡 ∗ −𝑝𝑡 ∗ + 𝜀𝑡+𝑘
𝑑 ;          (15)
   𝜌𝑗−1𝑘𝑗=1 𝑟𝑡+𝑗 = 𝑐𝑟𝑤 + 𝑏𝑟𝑤
𝑘  𝑑𝑡 ∗ −𝑝𝑡 ∗ + 𝜀𝑡+𝑘
𝑟𝑤 ;            (16)
   𝜌𝑗−1𝑘𝑗=1 ∆𝑑𝑡+𝑗 = 𝑐𝑑𝑤 + 𝑏𝑑𝑤
𝑘  𝑑𝑡 ∗ −𝑝𝑡 ∗ + 𝜀𝑡+𝑘
𝑑𝑤 .         (17) 
The first-order VAR system can then be expressed as: 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝑐𝑟𝑤 + 𝑏𝑟𝑤  𝑑𝑡 ∗ −𝑝𝑡 ∗ + 𝜀𝑡+1
𝑟𝑤 ;            (18) 
∆𝑑𝑡+1 = 𝑐𝑑𝑤 + 𝑏𝑑𝑤  𝑑𝑡 ∗ −𝑝𝑡 ∗ + 𝜀𝑡+1
𝑑𝑤 ;              (19) 
       𝑑𝑡+1 − 𝑝𝑡+1 = 𝑐𝑑−𝑝 + 𝑏𝑑−𝑝 𝑑𝑡 ∗ −𝑝𝑡 ∗ + 𝜀𝑡+1
𝑑−𝑝 ,            (20) 
where  𝑑𝑡 ∗ −𝑝𝑡 ∗  is the difference between the actual dividend–price ratio 
and the upward trend in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 Actual and equilibrium dividend–price ratios, 1931–2012. 
 
 
Tables 7 and 8 present the results for the weighted real and excess returns, and 
real and excess dividend growth regressions. The general conclusions in Table 7 
and 8 remain the same as those reported in Table 2 and 3: real and excess 
returns are predictable, but real and excess dividend growth are not. The only 
exception is that the direct coefficient for the 10-year dividend growth 
regression in Table 7 Panel D is now significant at the 5% level, comparing this 
figure with the 10-year dividend growth regression in Table 2 Panel D, we can 
see that the difference is not very significant: the direct coefficient for the 
10-year dividend growth regression in Table 2 is close to being significant at the 
10% level (with a p-value of 0.11). 
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Under the direct approach, the coefficients, t-statistics and R2 for the return and 
excess return regressions have substantially increased when d*-p* is used as the 
explanatory variable. In Table 2, the best-case scenario is that expected return 
and excess return volatility only account for about 70% and 60% of the variation 
in the dividend–price ratio, respectively. However, in Table 7, we can see that 
the expected return and excess return volatility account for a large percentage 
of the variation (as large as 94% at most) of the adjustments from the actual 
dividend–price ratios to their equilibrium values. Under the implied approach 
(Table 8), we can also see a significant increase in predictability when d*-p* is 
used as the explanatory variable. At the 3-year horizon, almost 90% of the 
expected return and excess return volatility is associated with the variation of 
the adjustments from the actual dividend–price ratios to their equilibrium 
values. The coefficients increase with the horizon: the expected return and 
excess return volatility account for 160% and 173% (or 157%, depending on 
which excess return series is used) of the variation in the adjustments from the 
actual dividend–price ratios to their equilibrium values at the long run. 
Although the use of an upward trend to represent the equilibrium 
dividend–price ratio may not be a very accurate measurement of the true 
equilibrium, the results in Table 7 and 8 serve as a warning: a significant portion 
of the return predictability in the New Zealand stock market seems to be related 
with historical events. We therefore need to pay attention to the historical 
events that generate financial data in dividend–price ratios and return 
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predictability research. This does not mean that there is no fundamental 
unchanging relationship between the variables, but this relationship seems to 
be overpowered by the effects of historical events. 
The results in Table 7 and 8 also suggest some meaningful implications. Firstly, if 
the observed predictability is related to historical events, we might not see the 
same predictability patterns that we have seen in previous chapters. For 
example, at some point in the future, the impact of some events may 
overwhelm the fundamental relationship among returns, dividend growth and 
dividend yields. If this happens, the methods such as those used in this research 
might not detect any predictive power. 
Secondly, the results in Table 7 and 8 indicate that data from different countries 
will produce different results because historical events are unique in each 
country. This conclusion is supported by Campbell (2003), Cornell (2014), 
Engsted and Pedersen (2010) and others. They found that there is strong 
evidence of return predictability in countries such as U.S., the U.K. and Australia. 
In countries such as Canada, France, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Denmark, dividend growth is predictable but not returns.  
Finally, the results suggest that we should pay attention to the impact of the 
historical events that generate our financial data. As Cornell (2013) 
argues:“Every historical event is unique, so data generated by an historical 
process are potentially completely nonstationary. It is possible, of course, that 
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nonstationary historical events produce stationary time series, but whether they 
do cannot be determined by examining the data alone without explicitly consider 
the historical events that generated it.” In terms of valuation ratios and return 
predictability research, although it is not easy to account for the influence of 
historical events, Campbell and Shiller (1998) shed some light on the issue. They 
adjust the valuation ratios such as the dividend–price ratio and the 
price–earnings ratio on the basis of different financial policies and business 
cycles. For example, they calculated an adjusted price–earnings ratio by taking 
an index of stock market prices such as S&P 500 and dividing this by the average 
of the last 10 years of aggregate earnings. They then regressed the adjusted 
price–earnings ratio on the future stock returns and found that the adjusted 
price–earnings ratio had significant predictive power for stock returns. 
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Table 7: Weighted direct regressions using d*-p* as the explanatory variable 
 
  
k Constant Coefficient NW standard 
error 
t-stats p-value  R2 
Panel A 
r 
1 0.05  0.37  0.10  3.92  0.00  0.16  
3 0.12  0.76  0.18  4.22  0.00  0.32  
5 0.18  0.91  0.18  4.96  0.00  0.31  
10 0.36  0.86  0.20  4.40  0.00  0.34  
15 0.48  0.77  0.19  4.08  0.00  0.32  
Panel B 
er 
1 0.03  0.37  0.09  3.93  0.00  0.16  
3 0.09  0.78  0.21  3.81  0.00  0.35  
5 0.13  0.94  0.27  3.47  0.00  0.33  
10 0.27  0.82  0.30  2.77  0.01  0.29  
15 0.37  0.65  0.30  2.14  0.04  0.19  
Panel C 
erp 
1 0.04  0.40  0.10  4.00  0.00  0.17  
3 0.11  0.86  0.32  2.68  0.01  0.25  
5 0.18  1.07  0.46  2.31  0.02  0.23  
10 0.38  0.80  0.67  1.19  0.24  0.09  
15 0.54  0.48  0.67  0.73  0.47  0.03  
Panel D 
∆𝑑 
1 -0.01  0.06  0.09  0.63  0.53  0.00  
3 -0.03  -0.06  0.10  -0.63  0.53  0.00  
5 -0.04  -0.02  0.15  -0.11  0.91  0.00  
10 -0.04  -0.28  0.13  -2.18  0.03  0.07  
15 -0.04  -0.29  0.21  -1.40  0.17  0.07  
Panel E 
∆𝑒𝑑 
1 -0.02  0.05  0.09  0.56  0.58  0.00  
3 -0.06  -0.04  0.15  -0.28  0.78  0.00  
5 -0.10  0.01  0.25  0.05  0.96  0.00  
10 -0.13  -0.32  0.26  -1.23  0.22  0.06  
15 -0.15  -0.41  0.33  -1.23  0.22  0.08  
Panel F 
∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 
1 -0.02  0.08  0.10  0.84  0.41  0.01  
3 -0.04  0.03  0.30  0.11  0.92  0.00  
5 -0.05  0.14  0.47  0.30  0.77  0.00  
10 -0.02  -0.35  0.63  -0.55  0.58  0.02  
15 0.02  -0.57  0.69  -0.83  0.41  0.04  
Predictability coefficients for estimates of d*-p*under the direct approach from the full 
1931–2012sample. 𝑟 is the log real return,𝑒𝑟 isthe log excess return and𝑒𝑟𝑝 is the log 
excess return assuming that the riskless bond is a perpetuity. ∆𝑑isthe log real dividend 
growth, ∆𝑒𝑑 is the log excess dividend growth and ∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 is the log excess dividend 
growth assuming that the riskless bond is a perpetuity. 
 
60 
 
Table 8: Weighted VAR-implied regressions using d*-p*as the explanatory variable 
 
 
 
 
 k Coefficient NW standard error t-stats p-value 
Panel 
A 
r 
1 0.37  0.10  3.92  0.00  
3 0.88  0.20  4.30  0.00  
5 1.18  0.27  4.39  0.00  
10 1.49  0.36  4.10  0.00  
15 1.57  0.41  3.85  0.00  
∞ 1.60  0.45  3.59  0.00  
Panel 
B 
er 
1 0.37  0.09  3.93  0.00  
3 0.86  0.20  4.29  0.00  
5 1.16  0.26  4.37  0.00  
10 1.46  0.36  4.06  0.00  
15 1.54  0.40  3.81  0.00  
∞ 1.57  0.44  3.54  0.00  
Panel 
C 
erp 
1 0.40  0.10  4.00  0.00  
3 0.95  0.23  4.18  0.00  
5 1.27  0.31  4.12  0.00  
10 1.61  0.44  3.69  0.00  
15 1.69  0.49  3.44  0.00  
∞ 1.73  0.54  3.20  0.00  
Panel 
D 
∆𝑑 
 
1 0.06  0.09  0.63  0.53  
3 0.13  0.21  0.63  0.53  
5 0.17  0.28  0.62  0.54  
10 0.22  0.36  0.61  0.54  
15 0.23  0.38  0.61  0.54  
∞ 0.24  0.39  0.60  0.55  
Panel 
E 
∆𝑒𝑑 
 
1 0.05  0.09  0.56  0.58  
3 0.11  0.21  0.55  0.58  
5 0.15  0.28  0.55  0.59  
10 0.19  0.36  0.54  0.59  
15 0.20  0.38  0.54  0.59  
∞ 0.21  0.39  0.53  0.60  
Panel 
F 
∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 
1 0.08  0.10  0.84  0.41  
3 0.20  0.24  0.82  0.41  
5 0.27  0.33  0.81  0.42  
10 0.34  0.43  0.79  0.43  
15 0.36  0.46  0.78  0.44  
∞ 0.36  0.47  0.77  0.45  
Predictability coefficients for estimates of d*-p*under the VAR approach from the full 
1931-2012sample. 𝑟 is the log real return,𝑒𝑟 isthe log excess return and𝑒𝑟𝑝 is log excess 
return assuming that the riskless bond is a perpetuity. ∆𝑑 isthe log real dividend growth, 
∆𝑒𝑑 is the log excess dividend growth and ∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 is the log excess dividend growth that 
assuming the riskless bond is a perpetuity.  
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Chapter 8 Out-of-Sample Forecasts 
Does the observed in-sample predictability still exist out of sample? In the real 
world, we cannot use the regressions in Table 2 and 3 to forecast future returns. 
We can only use the prevailing information to estimate the future returns but 
we cannot use the whole sample period. Therefore, good in-sample statistical 
significance does not necessarily indicate a good out-of-sample forecast. The 
study by Goyal and Welch (2003) is probably the one of the most impressive 
papers that discusses the out-of-sample predictability of dividend–price ratios. 
They compare two strategies that forecast returns. Firstly, they run a regression, 
𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+1,  from time 1 to time t and then use 𝑎 +
𝑏  𝑑𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡  to forecast the returns at time t+1. Second, they calculate the 
sample mean returns from time 1 to time t and use these sample means to 
predict the returns at time t+1. They then compare the mean squared error of 
both methods. In mathematical terms, this is: 
  𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑡 =  𝑆𝐸 𝑡 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 − 𝑆𝐸 𝑡 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛 𝑑  𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑇𝑡=1 ,                 (21) 
 
where 𝑆𝐸(𝑡) is the squared out-of-sample prediction error at year t. The 
prevailing mean 𝑆𝐸 is obtained when the prevailing up-to-date return average 
is used to predict the next year's real return. The conditional prediction errors of 
the dividend models are obtained from rolling regressions with the 
dividend–price ratio being the single predictor of the next year's real return.  
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Goyal and Welch (2003) plotted the difference between the squared prediction 
errors of both strategies in graph format. The results indicated that the superior 
performance of the dividend–price ratio model relies on the outlier effect. Once 
any outliers (only two outliers, in this case) are removed, the sample mean 
forecasts often outperform the dividend–price ratio forecasts for the U.S. data.  
In this chapter, I follow the approach of Goyal and Welch (2003) and examine 
whether New Zealand’s dividend–price ratios are useful for predicting returns 
out of sample. The main advantage of this method is that it allows us to 
compare predictability of different periods. It is very easy to see which strategy 
has the better performance for certain time periods in graph format. More 
importantly, as this method avoids the controversies of choosing the 
appropriate statistical inference, it examines the return predictability from a 
different angle. Unlike the approach of Goyal and Welch, which only reports 
out-of-sample evidence for excess returns at a 1-year horizon, this chapter 
reports out-of-sample forecasts for both real and excess returns at 3-, 5-, 10- 
and 15-year horizons. The first 30 years in the data (1931–1960) are used as the 
estimation period. 
In Figure 3a, b and c, a positive slope indicates that dividend–price ratio 
regression provides better predictions than the unconditional mean predictions 
out of sample. In Figure 3a, we can see that the unconditional mean model 
slightly outperforms the dividend–price ratio model in predicting real returns 
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from 1960 to the mid-1970s across different horizons. In addition, in the 1970s, 
there are more positive slopes than negative slopes at most horizons. Also, 
these positive slopes are very steep, indicating the much better performance of 
the dividend–price ratio model. Figure 3a indicates that the dividend–price ratio 
model generally outperforms the historical mean predictions (as most of the 
lines are above the red dashed line at 0) and it is clear that the real return is 
highly predictable after the mid-1970s. 
In Figure 3b and c, we can also see evidence of the out-of-sample excess return 
predictability at short to medium horizons (depending on which excess return 
series is used). As was the case for real returns, the unconditional mean model 
has better predictions than the dividend–price ratio model before the 
mid-1970s. After the mid-1970s, there are some good and bad prediction 
periods for the dividend–price ratio model across time (as the lines fluctuate 
significantly during some periods), but the good periods outweigh the bad 
periods, resulting a better performance for the dividend–price ratio model at 
short to medium horizons. However, these good prediction periods mainly come 
from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s. After 1990, the unconditional model 
provides better predictions most of the time. At long horizons (10–15-years, 
depending on which excess return series is used) the dividend–price ratio model 
does a very poor job at forecasting excess returns, as the unconditional mean 
model significantly outperforms the dividend–price ratio model. Again, the 
noise in the bond series might be a significant factor that causes dividend–price 
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ratio model to have poor performance at predicting excess returns. 
Although more and more studies, such as those of Pástor and Stambaugh (2006) 
and Cochrane (2008), have found more powerful tests that produce strong 
evidence for in-sample return predictability, the out-of-sample forecasts have 
remained relatively poor (especially for U.S. data). In contrast, Figure 3a–c show 
that the dividend–price ratio can provide good out-of-sample predictive power 
for real returns at short, medium and long horizons in the New Zealand stock 
market. It also has some predictive power for excess returns at the short to 
medium horizon. The findings in Figure 3a–c reinforce the findings of Chapter 5 
and demonstrate that the dividend–price ratios not only have significant 
in-sample predictive power for returns and excess returns, but they can also do 
a good job of predicting out-of-sample returns and excess returns in the New 
Zealand stock market. Furthermore, the results also reinforce the findings of 
Chapter 7, namely that every country has its unique historical events that 
produce financial data. While there certainly is a fundamental relationship 
between the variables, the predictive power of the dividend–price ratio may 
vary across countries. This also explains the reason why Goyal and Welch (2003) 
found little to no predictive power in the U.S. using the same method. 
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Figure 3a Cumulative Relative Out-of-Sample, Sum-Squared Error (SSE) 
Performance for Real Returns 
 
Explanation: This figure plots 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑡 , which is the cumulative sum-squared error from the 
unconditional model minus the cumulative sum-squared error from the dividend ratio 
model: 
𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑡 =  𝑆𝐸 𝑡 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 − 𝑆𝐸 𝑡 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑  𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙
𝑇
𝑡=1961
, 
where𝑆𝐸(𝑡) is the squared out-of-sample prediction error at year t. The unconditional 𝑆𝐸 
is obtained when the prevailing up-to-date real return average is used to predict the next 
year's real return. The conditional prediction errors of the dividend models are obtained 
from rolling regressions with the dividend–price ratio being the single predictor of the next 
year's real return.  
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Figure 3b Cumulative Relative Out-of-Sample, Sum-Squared Error (SSE) 
Performance for Excess Returns (er) 
 
Explanation: This figure plots 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑡 , which is the cumulative sum-squared error from the 
unconditional model minus the cumulative sum-squared error from the dividend ratio 
model: 
𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑡 =  𝑆𝐸 𝑡 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 − 𝑆𝐸 𝑡 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑  𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙
𝑇
𝑡=1961
, 
where𝑆𝐸(𝑡) is the squared out-of-sample prediction error at year t. The unconditional 𝑆𝐸 
is obtained when the prevailing up-to-date real return average is used to predict the next 
year's real return. The conditional prediction errors of the dividend models are obtained 
from rolling regressions with the dividend–price ratio being the single predictor of the next 
year's real return.  
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Figure 3c Cumulative Relative Out-of-Sample, Sum-Squared Error (SSE) 
Performance for Excess Returns (erp) 
 
Explanation: This figure plots 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑡 , which is the cumulative sum-squared error from the 
unconditional model minus the cumulative sum-squared error from the dividend ratio 
model: 
𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑡 =  𝑆𝐸 𝑡 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 − 𝑆𝐸 𝑡 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑  𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙
𝑇
𝑡=1961
, 
where𝑆𝐸(𝑡) is the squared out-of-sample prediction error at year t. The unconditional 𝑆𝐸 
is obtained when the prevailing up-to-date real return average is used to predict the next 
year's real return. The conditional prediction errors of the dividend models are obtained 
from rolling regressions with the dividend–price ratio being the single predictor of the next 
year's real return.  
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Chapter 9 Predictability for Individual Companies 
In the previous chapters, I found that the aggregate stock returns in the New 
Zealand stock market are highly predictable but the aggregate dividend growth 
is not. The natural question is now whether the predictive power of 
dividend–price ratios still exists down to the individual firm level. While there is 
a substantial body of research for predictability at the aggregate level, firm-level 
predictability research is relatively scarce. Vuolteenaho (2002) is probably the 
only paper that carefully examines predictability at the individual firm level. 
Vuolteenaho decomposed the U.S. firm-level returns into an expected return 
component (changes in the discount rate) and a dividend growth component 
(changes in cash-flow expectations) using a VAR model. He found that firm-level 
stock returns are mainly associated with dividend growth. He also aggregated 
these two components for each individual firm into an equal-weight index 
portfolio and the findings showed that while the variance of dividend growth 
component was about as twice as big as that of the variance of the expected 
return component for firm-level returns, the variance of the dividend growth 
component was only three-quarters of the expected return component for the 
equal-weight portfolio. He concluded that cash-flow expectations are more 
firm-specific and that therefore the dividend growth predictability tends to be 
diversified in an aggregate portfolio. 
This chapter aims to provide some New Zealand predictability evidence at the 
firm level using data from four New Zealand companies that have been 
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continually listed since as far back as 1964: Australia and New Zealand Banking 
Group Limited (ANZ; 1980–2012), The Colonial Motor Company Limited (CMO; 
1964–2012), Hallenstein Glasson Holdings Limited (HLG, 1972–2012) and Nuplex 
Industries Limited (NPX; 1970–2012). Annual data for these four companies 
from 1988 to 2012 were obtained from the NZX Company Research database. 
Data before 1988 have mainly been retrieved from The New Zealand Financial 
Times and National Business Review. Some data missing from The New Zealand 
Financial Times and National Business Review were collected from The Press and 
the New Zealand Herald. 
This chapter investigates the predictive power of the dividend–price ratios for 
the four companies listed above using both the direct and VAR approaches 
discussed in Chapter 3. Tables 9–12 display the direct weighted results for each 
of the four companies.10 For ANZ, the results show that beyond the 1-year 
horizon, dividend–price ratios mostly do not have any predictive power for real 
and excess returns. Dividend–price ratios predict future real returns at 1-year 
and 10-year horizons. Although the coefficient estimate for the 10-year real 
return regression is statistically significant, the R2 is very small: only 4%. 
Dividend–price ratios also predict excess (er but not erp) returns at the 1-year 
horizon with a coefficient of 0.45. On the other hand, we can see from Panels D, 
E and F in Table 9 that all estimates for the dividend growth predictability 
coefficient are economically large (with the correct signs) and are statistically 
                                                             
10
The unweighted results are very similar and hence are not reported. 
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significant at all horizons. Also the R2 values are relatively large, with values 
varying from 14% to 48%. The predictive power for dividend growth increases 
from short (1 year) to medium horizons (3 and 5 years) and then decreases at 
longer horizons (10 years). The predictability for dividend growth is strongest at 
the medium horizon (3- to 5-year horizons), where real and excess dividend 
growth variation accounts for about –100% and –137% (depending on which 
excess return series is used) of dividend–price ratio volatility, compared with 
–40% and –65% for real dividend growth at k =1 and 10, respectively; –45% and 
–92% (depending on which excess return series is used) for excess dividend 
growth at k =1 and 10, respectively. 
For CMO, dividend–price ratios strongly predict real and excess returns at all 
horizons. The return coefficient estimates are economically large and significant. 
The only one exception is that the 1-year excess return (erp) coefficient is very 
close to being significant: with a p-value of 0.07. All return regressions also have 
reasonably large R2 values. This predictive power also increases with the horizon. 
At the 1-year horizon, the predictability is only about 12–16% for real and excess 
returns. This predictive power increases with the horizon and approaches 76% 
and 54% (er) at the 10-year horizon for real and excess returns, respectively. The 
real and excess dividend growth are mainly unpredictable for CMO: only the 
10-year excess dividend growth is predictable, with the predictability 
approaching–27% (𝑒𝑑) and –43% (𝑒𝑑𝑝). 
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From Table 11, we can see that dividend–price ratios predict real and excess 
returns only at medium to long horizons for HGL. Dividend–price ratios only 
start to predict real returns from the 3-year horizon and beyond. For excess 
return predictability, dividend–price ratios predict er at the 5- and 10-year 
horizons, and predict erp only at the 10-year horizon. On the other hand, 
although dividend–price ratios do not predict returns at the 1-year horizon, they 
predict real and excess dividend growth at the 1-year horizon. At the 1-year 
horizon, real and excess dividend growth volatility is associated with –25%,  
–29% (for ed) or –38% (for edp) dividend–price ratio variation respectively. 
Beyond the 1-year horizon, dividend yields do not have any predictive power for 
dividend growth. 
For NPX, dividend–price ratios do not predict real and excess returns below the 
10-year horizon. The real and excess return coefficient estimates only become 
significant at the 10-year horizon. However, the R2 values are tiny, with values 
around only 5%. Additionally, the real and excess dividend growth are very much 
predictable (the 5- and 10-year real dividend growth estimates are significant at 
0.1; excess dividend growth estimates are significant at 0.05 for all values of k). 
However, instead of increasing in predictability, dividend growth predictability is 
stronger at shorter horizons and weaker at longer horizons. At the 1- and 3-year 
horizons, the real and excess dividend growth predictability are around –85%. 
This predictability decreased significantly to –46% and –55% for real and excess 
dividend growth (ed) at the 10-year horizon, respectively. 
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Table 9 : Direct weighted regressions for ANZ, 1980–2012 
 
  
k Constant Coefficient NW 
standard  
error 
t-stats p-value R2  
Panel A 
r 
1 1.48  0.50  0.21  2.33  0.03  0.15  
3 0.26  0.06  0.29  0.21  0.84  0.00  
5 0.02  -0.04  0.27  -0.13  0.90  0.00  
10 1.36  0.36  0.17  2.12  0.05  0.04  
Panel B 
er 
1 1.29  0.45  0.21  2.12  0.04  0.13  
3 -0.15  -0.04  0.30  -0.13  0.89  0.00  
5 -0.49  -0.14  0.31  -0.44  0.66  0.01  
10 0.61  0.24  0.18  1.32  0.20  0.02  
Panel C 
erp 
1 0.66  0.24  0.21  1.15  0.26  0.04  
3 -0.99  -0.31  0.34  -0.92  0.37  0.04  
5 -1.04  -0.30  0.43  -0.70  0.49  0.02  
10 -0.01  0.09  0.21  0.43  0.68  0.00  
Panel D 
∆𝑑 
 
1 -1.15  -0.40  0.16  -2.53  0.02  0.18  
3 -2.86  -1.01  0.29  -3.50  0.00  0.31  
5 -3.09  -1.10  0.25  -4.42  0.00  0.35  
10 -1.59  -0.65  0.16  -4.15  0.00  0.14  
Panel E 
∆𝑒𝑑 
 
1 -1.33  -0.45  0.16  -2.90  0.01  0.22  
3 -3.28  -1.11  0.30  -3.66  0.00  0.37  
5 -3.59  -1.20  0.28  -4.36  0.00  0.39  
10 -2.34  -0.77  0.19  -4.11  0.00  0.17  
Panel  
F 
∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 
 
1 -1.97  -0.66  0.15  -4.37  0.00  0.39  
3 -4.11  -1.37  0.34  -3.99  0.00  0.48  
5 -4.15  -1.37  0.40  -3.45  0.00  0.37  
10 -2.96  -0.92  0.25  -3.71  0.00  0.21  
Predictability coefficient estimates for the weighted direct approach for ANZ from 1980 to 
2012. 𝑟 is the log real return,𝑒𝑟isthe log excess return and𝑒𝑟𝑝 is the log excess return 
assuming that the riskless bond is a perpetuity. ∆𝑑is the log real dividend growth, ∆𝑒𝑑 is 
the log excess dividend growth and ∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 is the log excess dividend growth assuming that 
the riskless bond is a perpetuity. 
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Table 10 : Direct weighted regressions for CMO,1964–2012 
 
  
k Constant Coefficient NW  
standard  
error 
t-stats p-value R2  
Panel A 
r 
1 0.36  0.16  0.06  2.65  0.01  0.13  
3 0.72  0.34  0.09  3.67  0.00  0.29  
5 1.13  0.53  0.14  3.86  0.00  0.39  
10 1.56  0.76  0.08  9.15  0.00  0.59  
Panel B 
er 
1 0.30  0.14  0.06  2.38  0.02  0.11  
3 0.52  0.28  0.09  3.02  0.00  0.23  
5 0.80  0.44  0.14  3.24  0.00  0.31  
10 0.81  0.54  0.05  11.19  0.00  0.46  
Panel C 
erp 
1 0.25  0.12  0.06  1.88  0.07  0.07  
3 0.43  0.24  0.11  2.27  0.03  0.13  
5 0.75  0.40  0.16  2.57  0.01  0.20  
10 0.46  0.38  0.10  3.74  0.00  0.16  
Panel D 
∆𝑑 
 
1 -0.26  -0.08  0.07  -1.18  0.25  0.03  
3 -0.39  -0.10  0.10  -1.00  0.32  0.02  
5 -0.24  -0.02  0.11  -0.19  0.85  0.00  
10 -0.47  -0.05  0.11  -0.48  0.63  0.00  
Panel E 
∆𝑒𝑑 
 
1 -0.33  -0.10  0.07  -1.43  0.16  0.04  
3 -0.58  -0.15  0.11  -1.42  0.16  0.04  
5 -0.57  -0.11  0.12  -0.92  0.36  0.02  
10 -1.22  -0.27  0.06  -4.42  0.00  0.11  
Panel  
F 
∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 
 
1 -0.38  -0.12  0.08  -1.58  0.12  0.05  
3 -0.67  -0.19  0.12  -1.58  0.12  0.06  
5 -0.63  -0.15  0.15  -0.97  0.34  0.03  
10 -1.57  -0.43  0.07  -6.42  0.00  0.22  
Predictability coefficient estimates for the weighted direct approach for CMO from 1964 to 
2012. 𝑟 is the log real return,𝑒𝑟isthe log excess return and𝑒𝑟𝑝 is the log excess return 
assuming that the riskless bond is a perpetuity. ∆𝑑is the log real dividend growth, ∆𝑒𝑑 is 
the log excess dividend growth and ∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 is the log excess dividend growth assuming that 
the riskless bond is a perpetuity. 
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Table 11 : Direct weighted regressions for HGL,1972–2012 
 
  
k Constant Coefficient NW  
standard  
error 
t-stats p-value R2  
Panel A 
r 
1 0.65  0.28  0.15  1.82  0.08  0.08  
3 1.60  0.69  0.33  2.06  0.05  0.16  
5 2.42  1.04  0.46  2.27  0.03  0.25  
10 1.99  0.89  0.25  3.61  0.00  0.20  
Panel B 
er 
1 0.54  0.25  0.15  1.61  0.12  0.06  
3 1.32  0.61  0.33  1.84  0.07  0.13  
5 2.06  0.94  0.46  2.03  0.05  0.22  
10 1.51  0.80  0.22  3.62  0.00  0.19  
Panel C 
erp 
1 0.32  0.16  0.15  1.03  0.31  0.03  
3 0.89  0.42  0.34  1.25  0.22  0.07  
5 1.55  0.72  0.48  1.51  0.14  0.14  
10 1.02  0.59  0.27  2.22  0.03  0.13  
Panel D 
∆𝑑 
 
1 -0.67  -0.25  0.11  -2.33  0.03  0.12  
3 -0.46  -0.15  0.42  -0.37  0.72  0.01  
5 0.24  0.15  0.50  0.29  0.77  0.01  
10 -0.06  0.05  0.32  0.16  0.88  0.00  
Panel E 
∆𝑒𝑑 
 
1 -0.78  -0.29  0.11  -2.72  0.01  0.16  
3 -0.74  -0.23  0.40  -0.59  0.56  0.03  
5 -0.12  0.05  0.48  0.10  0.92  0.00  
10 -0.54  -0.05  0.26  -0.18  0.86  0.00  
Panel  
F 
∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 
 
1 -1.00  -0.38  0.11  -3.34  0.00  0.23  
3 -1.17  -0.42  0.39  -1.08  0.29  0.08  
5 -0.63  -0.17  0.47  -0.36  0.72  0.01  
10 -1.03  -0.25  0.26  -0.97  0.34  0.02  
Predictability coefficient estimates for the weighted direct approach for HGL from 1972 to 
2012.  𝑟 is the log real return,𝑒𝑟isthe log excess return and𝑒𝑟𝑝 is the log excess return 
assuming that the riskless bond is a perpetuity. ∆𝑑is the log real dividend growth, ∆𝑒𝑑 is 
the log excess dividend growth and ∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 is the log excess dividend growth assuming that 
the riskless bond is a perpetuity. 
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Table 12 : Direct weighted regressions for NPX,1970–2012 
 
  
k Constant Coefficient NW  
standard  
error 
t-stats p-value R2  
Panel A 
r 
1 0.64  0.24  0.16  1.52  0.14  0.05  
3 -0.23  -0.02  0.27  -0.08  0.94  0.00  
5 1.05  0.46  0.36  1.28  0.21  0.03  
10 1.19  0.54  0.23  2.30  0.03  0.05  
Panel B 
er 
1 0.59  0.23  0.16  1.50  0.14  0.05  
3 -0.35  -0.04  0.24  -0.19  0.85  0.00  
5 0.77  0.39  0.30  1.33  0.19  0.03  
10 0.72  0.45  0.15  3.03  0.01  0.06  
Panel C 
erp 
1 0.64  0.25  0.16  1.53  0.13  0.06  
3 -0.29  -0.03  0.20  -0.17  0.87  0.00  
5 0.59  0.31  0.28  1.13  0.27  0.02  
10 0.45  0.33  0.15  2.23  0.03  0.03  
Panel D 
∆𝑑 
 
1 -2.45  -0.84  0.15  -5.75  0.00  0.45  
3 -2.58  -0.84  0.25  -3.39  0.00  0.21  
5 -2.08  -0.64  0.35  -1.81  0.08  0.07  
10 -1.67  -0.46  0.26  -1.74  0.09  0.03  
Panel E 
∆𝑒𝑑 
 
1 -2.50  -0.84  0.14  -6.01  0.00  0.47  
3 -2.70  -0.87  0.21  -4.10  0.00  0.24  
5 -2.36  -0.70  0.29  -2.42  0.02  0.09  
10 -2.14  -0.55  0.17  -3.22  0.00  0.07  
Panel  
F 
∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 
 
1 -2.46  -0.83  0.14  -6.01  0.00  0.47  
3 -2.64  -0.85  0.17  -4.90  0.00  0.27  
5 -2.54  -0.78  0.25  -3.11  0.00  0.11  
10 -2.41  -0.67  0.09  -7.05  0.00  0.10  
Predictability coefficient estimates for the weighted direct approach for NPX from 1970 
to2012. 𝑟 is the log real return,𝑒𝑟isthe log excess return and𝑒𝑟𝑝 is the log excess return 
assuming that the riskless bond is a perpetuity. ∆𝑑is the log real dividend growth, ∆𝑒𝑑 is 
the log excess dividend growth and ∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 is the log excess dividend growth assuming that 
the riskless bond is a perpetuity. 
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Tables 13–16 show the results from the implied approach. Under this approach, 
the returns are predictable for all four companies almost across all horizons if 
we relax the significance level to 0.1. The real and excess (er) return coefficient 
estimates are significant at 0.05 at all horizons for ANZ and CMO. If we use the 
0.1 significance level, the real and excess (er) return coefficients for HGL and 
NPX are also significantly different from zero at different horizons (there are 
three exceptions: the 1-year real return for NPX and the 1-year excess return (er) 
for both HGL and NPX. But the p-values are not very far from the 0.1 significance 
level: the highest p-value is 0.14). Under the implied approach, we can still see a 
increase in return predictability with increasing time horizons but this increase is 
not very strong. There is an increase in return coefficients from the 1-year to the 
3-year horizon for ANZ CMO and HGL, but the increase becomes smaller as the 
horizon increases. Moreover, from the results in Panel B and C in Tables 13–15, 
we can see that the null hypothesis of no return predictability is more likely to 
be rejected when the excess return series is calculated using the yields of the 
10-year government bonds compared with assumption that the riskless bond is 
a perpetuity.  
The real and excess dividend growth are also predictable for ANZ, HGL and NPX 
at all horizons. However, this dividend growth predictability does not increase 
significantly with increasing time horizons. Except for the increases in both the 
real and excess return coefficients from the 1-year to 3-year horizons for HGL, 
the dividend growth coefficients are almost the same across different horizons 
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for these three companies. For CMO, real dividend growth is not predictable 
across all horizons, but excess dividend growth is predictable at medium to long 
horizons using the 0.1 significance level. 
In summary, both the direct and VAR approach find mixed predictability 
evidence for individual companies. This is similar to what Maio and Santa-Clara 
(2013) found in the U.S. data. They found that dividend growth predictability 
tends to be strong for medium to small stocks, but the predictability of expected 
returns explains a large proportion of the variation in the dividend yield for large 
stocks. At the individual firm level, the conclusion that return predictability is 
the main driver of variation in the dividend–price ratio of the aggregate market 
portfolio does not apply. In some cases, dividend–price ratios predict returns. In 
other cases, dividend–price ratios predict both future returns and dividend 
growth. There is no situation where dividend–price ratios predict neither returns 
nor dividend growth. This confirms the claim by Cochrane (2008) that 
dividend-price ratios must predict returns or dividend growth or both, and that 
there must be a fundamental relationship among expected returns, future 
dividend growth and dividend–price ratios.  
Why is it that both dividend growth and returns are predictable at the firm level 
but only returns are predictable at the aggregate level? One possible answer 
follows the arguments of Bali, Demirtas and Tehranian (2008) and Vuolteenaho 
(2002). Dividend growth contains two components: one is explained by the 
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aggregate dividend growth (systematic dividend growth); the other is explained 
by the situation of each individual firm (unsystematic dividend growth). At the 
firm level, the unsystematic dividend growth can be predictable; however, when 
firm-level dividend growth is used to produce aggregate-level dividend growth, 
the unsystematic dividend growth tends to be diversified. Therefore, the 
aggregate dividend growth cannot be predicted. On the other hand, firm-level 
dividends (cash-flow) are highly correlated with future stock returns. This 
relationship does not vanish at the aggregate level and thus returns are 
predictable at the aggregate level. Another possible explanation has been 
provided by Leary and Michaely (2010), who argued that firms have a tendency 
to smooth dividend payments and therefore dividend growth is less predictable 
in a market in which a relatively large proportion of firms smooth their dividend 
payments. 
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Table 13: Weighted regressions implied by VAR for ANZ, 1980–2012 
  
k Coefficient NW 
standard 
error 
t-stats p-value 
Panel A 
r 
1 0.50  0.21  2.33  0.03  
3 0.55  0.18  2.99  0.00  
5 0.55  0.18  3.01  0.00  
10 0.55  0.18  3.01  0.00  
∞ 0.55  0.18  3.03  0.00  
Panel B 
er 
1 0.45  0.21  2.12  0.04  
3 0.49  0.18  2.69  0.01  
5 0.49  0.18  2.71  0.01  
10 0.49  0.18  2.71  0.01  
∞ 0.49  0.18  2.73  0.01  
Panel C 
erp 
1 0.24  0.21  1.15  0.26  
3 0.26  0.20  1.33  0.19  
5 0.26  0.20  1.34  0.18  
10 0.26  0.20  1.34  0.18  
∞ 0.26  0.20  1.35  0.18  
Panel D 
∆𝑑 
1 -0.40  0.16  -2.53  0.02  
3 -0.45  0.18  -2.46  0.02  
5 -0.45  0.18  -2.45  0.02  
10 -0.45  0.18  -2.45  0.02  
∞ -0.45  0.18  -2.43  0.02  
Panel E 
∆𝑒𝑑 
 
1 -0.45  0.16  -2.90  0.01  
3 -0.50  0.18  -2.76  0.01  
5 -0.50  0.18  -2.75  0.01  
10 -0.50  0.18  -2.75  0.01  
∞ -0.50  0.18  -2.72  0.01  
Panel F 
∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 
 
1 -0.66  0.15  -4.37  0.00  
3 -0.73  0.19  -3.77  0.00  
5 -0.73  0.20  -3.73  0.00  
10 -0.73  0.20  -3.73  0.00  
∞ -0.73  0.20  -3.65  0.00  
Predictability coefficient estimates for the weighted VAR approach for ANZ from 1980 to 
2012. 𝑟 is the log real return,𝑒𝑟isthe log excess return and𝑒𝑟𝑝 is log excess return 
assuming that the riskless bond is a perpetuity. ∆𝑑is the log real dividend growth, ∆𝑒𝑑 is 
the log excess dividend growth and ∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 is the log excess dividend growth assuming that 
the riskless bond is a perpetuity. Weight,𝜌=0.948; dividend–price ratio persistence,∅ = 
0.10. 
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Table 14: Weighted regressions implied by VAR for CMO, 1964–2012 
  
k Coefficient NW 
standard 
error 
t-stats p-value 
Panel A 
r 
1 0.16  0.06  2.65  0.01  
3 0.35  0.12  2.93  0.00  
5 0.45  0.15  3.05  0.00  
10 0.53  0.17  3.05  0.00  
∞ 0.55  0.19  2.93  0.00  
Panel B 
er 
1 0.14  0.06  2.38  0.02  
3 0.31  0.12  2.61  0.01  
5 0.40  0.15  2.73  0.01  
10 0.47  0.17  2.78  0.01  
∞ 0.49  0.18  2.72  0.01  
Panel C 
erp 
1 0.12  0.06  1.88  0.07  
3 0.27  0.13  2.01  0.05  
5 0.34  0.17  2.07  0.04  
10 0.41  0.19  2.11  0.04  
∞ 0.42  0.20  2.10  0.04  
Panel D 
∆𝑑 
1 -0.08  0.07  -1.18  0.25  
3 -0.19  0.15  -1.26  0.21  
5 -0.24  0.18  -1.33  0.19  
10 -0.28  0.20  -1.42  0.16  
∞ -0.29  0.20  -1.48  0.14  
Panel E 
∆𝑒𝑑 
 
1 -0.10  0.07  -1.43  0.16  
3 -0.22  0.14  -1.56  0.12  
5 -0.29  0.17  -1.65  0.10  
10 -0.34  0.19  -1.78  0.08  
∞ -0.35  0.19  -1.86  0.07  
Panel F 
∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 
 
1 -0.12  0.08  -1.58  0.12  
3 -0.27  0.15  -1.72  0.09  
5 -0.34  0.19  -1.83  0.07  
10 -0.40  0.21  -1.96  0.05  
∞ -0.42  0.21  -2.03  0.05  
Predictability coefficient estimates for the weighted VAR approach for CMO from 1964 to 
2012. 𝑟 is the log real return,𝑒𝑟isthe log excess return and𝑒𝑟𝑝 is log excess return 
assuming that the riskless bond is a perpetuity. ∆𝑑is the log real dividend growth, ∆𝑒𝑑 is 
the log excess dividend growth and ∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 is the log excess dividend growth assuming that 
the riskless bond is a perpetuity. Weight,𝜌=0.94; dividend–price ratio persistence,∅ = 0.76. 
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Table 15: Weighted regressions implied by VAR for HGL, 1972–2012 
  
k Coefficient NW 
standard 
error 
t-stats p-value 
Panel A 
r 
1 0.28  0.15  1.82  0.08  
3 0.45  0.21  2.19  0.03  
5 0.49  0.21  2.33  0.02  
10 0.49  0.21  2.38  0.02  
∞ 0.49  0.20  2.42  0.02  
Panel B 
er 
1 0.25  0.15  1.61  0.12  
3 0.40  0.21  1.90  0.06  
5 0.42  0.21  2.01  0.05  
10 0.43  0.21  2.05  0.04  
∞ 0.43  0.21  2.09  0.04  
Panel C 
erp 
1 0.16  0.15  1.03  0.31  
3 0.25  0.22  1.14  0.26  
5 0.27  0.23  1.18  0.24  
10 0.27  0.23  1.19  0.24  
∞ 0.27  0.23  1.21  0.23  
Panel D 
∆𝑑 
1 -0.25  0.11  -2.33  0.03  
3 -0.41  0.18  -2.31  0.02  
5 -0.44  0.20  -2.24  0.03  
10 -0.45  0.20  -2.20  0.03  
∞ -0.45  0.21  -2.17  0.03  
Panel E 
∆𝑒𝑑 
 
1 -0.29  0.11  -2.72  0.01  
3 -0.47  0.18  -2.67  0.01  
5 -0.50  0.20  -2.55  0.01  
10 -0.51  0.20  -2.50  0.01  
∞ -0.51  0.21  -2.45  0.02  
Panel F 
∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 
 
1 -0.38  0.11  -3.34  0.00  
3 -0.61  0.19  -3.27  0.00  
5 -0.66  0.21  -3.08  0.00  
10 -0.66  0.22  -2.99  0.00  
∞ -0.66  0.23  -2.91  0.00  
Predictability coefficient estimates for the weighted VAR approach for HGL from 1972 to 
2012. 𝑟 is the log real return,𝑒𝑟isthe log excess return and𝑒𝑟𝑝 is log excess return 
assuming that the riskless bond is a perpetuity. ∆𝑑is the log real dividend growth, ∆𝑒𝑑 is 
the log excess dividend growth and ∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 is the log excess dividend growth assuming that 
the riskless bond is a perpetuity. Weight,𝜌=0.923; dividend–price ratio persistence,∅ = 
0.46. 
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Table 16: Weighted regressions implied by VAR for NPX, 1970–2012 
  
k Coefficient NW 
standard 
error 
t-stats p-value 
Panel A 
r 
1 0.24  0.16  1.52  0.14  
3 0.23  0.13  1.69  0.10  
5 0.23  0.13  1.69  0.10  
10 0.23  0.13  1.69  0.10  
∞ 0.23  0.13  1.70  0.09  
Panel B 
er 
1 0.23  0.16  1.50  0.14  
3 0.22  0.13  1.67  0.10  
5 0.22  0.13  1.67  0.10  
10 0.22  0.13  1.67  0.10  
∞ 0.22  0.13  1.68  0.10  
Panel C 
erp 
1 0.25  0.16  1.53  0.13  
3 0.23  0.13  1.73  0.09  
5 0.23  0.13  1.73  0.09  
10 0.23  0.13  1.73  0.09  
∞ 0.23  0.13  1.74  0.09  
Panel D 
∆𝑑 
1 -0.84  0.15  -5.75  0.00  
3 -0.78  0.13  -5.86  0.00  
5 -0.78  0.13  -5.83  0.00  
10 -0.78  0.13  -5.82  0.00  
∞ -0.78  0.14  -5.72  0.00  
Panel E 
∆𝑒𝑑 
 
1 -0.84  0.14  -6.01  0.00  
3 -0.79  0.13  -6.08  0.00  
5 -0.79  0.13  -6.04  0.00  
10 -0.79  0.13  -6.04  0.00  
∞ -0.79  0.13  -5.92  0.00  
Panel F 
∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 
 
1 -0.83  0.14  -6.01  0.00  
3 -0.77  0.13  -5.84  0.00  
5 -0.77  0.13  -5.81  0.00  
10 -0.77  0.13  -5.81  0.00  
∞ -0.77  0.14  -5.69  0.00  
Predictability coefficient estimates for the weighted VAR approach for NPX from 1970 to 
2012. 𝑟 is the log real return,𝑒𝑟isthe log excess return and𝑒𝑟𝑝 is log excess return 
assuming that the riskless bond is a perpetuity. ∆𝑑is the log real dividend growth, ∆𝑒𝑑 is 
the log excess dividend growth and ∆𝑒𝑑𝑝 is the log excess dividend growth assuming that 
the riskless bond is a perpetuity. Weight,𝜌=0.947; dividend–price ratio persistence,∅ = 
–0.08. 
 
 
83 
 
Chapter 10 Conclusion 
There is a general conviction that variation in dividend–price ratios is associated 
with the expected returns but not with expected dividend growth (i.e., returns 
are predictable but dividend growth is not). However, most of the evidence 
comes from the U.S. and this topic has not been carefully examined in the New 
Zealand stock market. This research tries to fill this gap and investigates the 
predictive power of dividend yields on stock returns using the New Zealand 
stock market data from 1930 to 2012. The results from both the direct 
regression and VAR approach confirm that the general conclusion in the 
literature in New Zealand data: real (or excess) returns are predictable at short, 
medium and long horizons by dividend–price ratios, but real (or excess) dividend 
growth is not.  
Return predictability is generally accepted in the literature; however, the 
interpretation of it is contentious. Return predictability can be potentially 
associated with either risk-pricing or irrational mispricing. On the basis of the 
idea that if mispricing is the cause of the observed predictability, we should see 
a fall in the estimated return coefficients when mispricing is substantially 
reduced in the market. This research divides the New Zealand stock market data 
in to two sub-samples separated by the financial sector reform which happened 
in 1984. By comparing the return coefficients from these two sub-samples, the 
results suggest that the return predictability in the New Zealand stock market is 
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not primarily due to mispricing. 
Furthermore, this research also examines the influence of historical events on 
return predictability. While there is a certain fundamental relationship between 
dividend–price ratio and returns (or excess returns), it seems that the influence 
of historical events has outweighed this relationship in the New Zealand data. 
This finding is similar to that of Cornell (2013) for the U.S. data, suggesting that 
the observed return predictability patterns may not hold in the future once the 
influence of some future events overwhelms the fundamental relationship 
between the variables. The results also suggest that we need to pay more 
attention to the influence of historical events in terms of dividend yields and 
return predictability research.  
Furthermore, in addition to examining the in-sample predictability, this research 
also examines the out-of-sample predictive power of dividend–price ratios. 
Unlike the out-of-sample tests on the U.S. data, which commonly report poor 
out-of-sample predictability for dividend–price ratios, this research finds that 
dividend–price ratios have strong out-of-sample predictive power for real 
returns at short, medium and long horizons. Dividend–price ratios also show 
some good out-of-sample predictive power for excess returns at short to 
medium horizons. 
Finally, this research also tries to answer the question whether the predictive 
power of dividend–price ratios still exists down to the individual firm level. By 
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using the data on four continually listed companies in the New Zealand stock 
market, the results suggest that the predictive power of dividend–price ratios is 
mixed at the firm level. For some firms, dividend–price ratios predict future 
returns. For other firms, dividend–price ratios predict future dividend growth or 
both. The results also suggest that the common perception that return 
predictability is the main driver of variation in the dividend–price ratio of the 
aggregate market portfolio does not apply at the firm level. The predictability of 
firm-level dividend growth vanishes at the aggregate level. On the other hand, 
the strong relationship between dividend payments, price and future returns 
also holds at the aggregate level, and thus future returns are still predictable.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
To compute the standard errors for the implied long-horizon coefficients, 
𝑏𝑖
𝑘  (𝑖 = 𝑟, 𝑑 𝑜𝑟 𝑑 − 𝑝), the Delta method is used: 
     𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑏𝑖
𝑘 = (
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝑘
𝑑𝑏𝑖
) ∙  ∙ (
𝜕𝑏𝑖
𝑘
𝑑𝑏𝑖
)𝑇. 
The unweighted long-horizon coefficients can be written as: 
     𝑏𝑟
(𝑘)
= 𝑏𝑟
1−∅𝑘
1−∅
; 
     𝑏𝑑
 𝑘 = 𝑏𝑑
1−∅𝑘
1−∅
; 
     𝑏𝑑𝑝
(𝑘)
= ∅𝑘 . 
Therefore:  
 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑏𝑟
 𝑘  =  𝜕𝑏𝑟
 𝑘 
𝜕𝑏𝑟
𝜕𝑏𝑟
 𝑘 
𝜕∅
  
𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑏𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝑏𝑟 ,∅ 
𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝑏𝑟 , ∅ 𝑉𝑎𝑟 ∅ 
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 𝑘 
𝜕𝑏𝑟
𝜕𝑏𝑟
 𝑘 
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  =  
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1−∅
−𝑘𝑏𝑟∅
𝑘−1 1−∅ +𝑏𝑟 1−∅
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 1−∅ 2
  
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑏𝑟) 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑏𝑟 ,∅)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑏𝑟 ,∅) 𝑉𝑎𝑟(∅)
  
1−∅𝑘
1−∅
−𝑘𝑏𝑟∅
𝑘−1 1−∅ +𝑏𝑟 1−∅
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 1−∅ 2
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𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑏𝑑
 𝑘  =  
𝜕𝑏𝑑
 𝑘 
𝜕𝑏𝑑
𝜕𝑏𝑑
 𝑘 
𝜕∅
  
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑏𝑑) 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑏𝑑 , ∅)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑏𝑑 , ∅) 𝑉𝑎𝑟(∅)
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 𝑘 
𝜕𝑏𝑑
𝜕𝑏𝑑
 𝑘 
𝜕∅
 =
92 
 
 
1−∅𝑘
1−∅
−𝑘𝑏𝑑∅
𝑘−1 1−∅ +𝑏𝑑 1−∅
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 1−∅ 2
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and: 
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The weighted long-horizon coefficients can be written as: 
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                                                ∙
 
 
 
 
 
 
1−𝜌𝑘∅𝑘
1−𝜌∅
−𝑘𝑏𝑑𝜌
𝑘−1∅𝑘 1−𝜌∅ +∅𝑏𝑑 1−𝜌
𝑘∅𝑘 
 1−𝜌∅ 2
−𝑘𝑏𝑑𝜌
𝑘∅𝑘−1 1−𝜌∅ +𝜌𝑏𝑑 1−𝜌
𝑘∅𝑘 
 1−𝜌∅ 2  
 
 
 
 
 
, 
and: 
Var 𝑏𝑑−𝑝
 𝑘  =  
𝜕𝑏𝑑𝑝
 𝑘 
𝜕𝜌
𝜕𝑏𝑑𝑝
 𝑘 
𝜕∅
  
𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝜌 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜌, ∅)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜌, ∅) 𝑉𝑎𝑟 ∅ 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝜕𝑏𝑑𝑝
 𝑘 
𝜕𝜌
𝜕𝑏𝑑𝑝
 𝑘 
𝜕∅  
 
 
 
 
 
=  𝑘𝜌𝑘−1∅𝑘 𝑘𝜌𝑘∅𝑘−1  
𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝜌 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜌, ∅)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜌, ∅) 𝑉𝑎𝑟 ∅ 
  
𝑘𝜌𝑘−1∅𝑘
𝑘𝜌𝑘∅𝑘−1
 . 
 
As Equation (4) in Chapter 3 indicates that 1 ≈ 𝑏𝑟
𝑘 − 𝑏∆𝑑
𝑘 + 𝜌𝑘𝑏𝑑−𝑝
𝑘 , the 
covariance between each variable involved in the delta method can therefore be 
derived using this identity 
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Appendix B 
The dividend–price ratio is calculated as the difference in returns between the 
Gross index (which includes capital gains and cash dividends) and the capital 
index (which includes capital gains only). Therefore the dividend–price ratio at 
the end of each year is: 
                        
𝐷𝑡
𝑃𝑡
= (
𝐷𝑡+𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
−
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
) ×
𝑃𝑡−1
𝑃𝑡
. 
The dividend growth for each year is calculated as follows: 
∆ 𝐷𝑡 =
𝐷𝑡
𝑃𝑡
× 𝑃𝑡
𝐷𝑡−1
𝑃𝑡−1
× 𝑃𝑡−1
− 1. 
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Appendix C 
Table 1C: Pre-reform robustness test for 1-year real returns 
Year Coefficient NW standard error t-stats p-value R2 No. of 
obs 
1931–50 0.23 0.12 1.92 0.07 0.22 20 
1931–51 0.26 0.10 2.62 0.02 0.26 21 
1931–52 0.26 0.12 2.25 0.04 0.26 22 
1931–53 0.27 0.12 2.31 0.03 0.26 23 
1931–54 0.27 0.12 2.31 0.03 0.26 24 
1931–55 0.27 0.12 2.31 0.03 0.26 25 
1931–56 0.27 0.12 2.37 0.03 0.27 26 
1931–57 0.27 0.12 2.33 0.03 0.24 27 
1931–58 0.30 0.12 2.55 0.02 0.24 28 
1931–59 0.31 0.12 2.57 0.02 0.24 29 
1931–60 0.32 0.12 2.66 0.01 0.24 30 
1931–61 0.32 0.12 2.69 0.01 0.24 31 
1931–62 0.33 0.12 2.82 0.01 0.26 32 
1931–63 0.33 0.12 2.84 0.01 0.26 33 
       
1952–84 0.26 0.15 1.82 0.08 0.10 33 
1953–84 0.28 0.15 1.89 0.07 0.11 32 
1954–84 0.29 0.15 1.97 0.06 0.12 31 
1955–84 0.30 0.15 2.00 0.06 0.12 30 
1956–84 0.30 0.15 1.99 0.06 0.12 29 
1957–84   0.32** 0.15 2.08 0.05 0.13 28 
1958–84 0.30 0.16 1.95 0.06 0.12 27 
1959–84  0.33* 0.15 2.18 0.04 0.15 26 
1960–84   0.36** 0.15 2.33 0.03 0.16 25 
1961–84 0.35 0.16 2.17 0.04 0.15 24 
1962–84   0.38** 0.16 2.28 0.03 0.16 23 
1963–84  0.41* 0.16 2.50 0.02 0.19 22 
1964–84  0.44* 0.16 2.70 0.01 0.21 21 
1965–84  0.45* 0.18 2.55 0.02 0.20 20 
The coefficients were obtained using the direct approach. * and ** indicate that 
the latter sub-period coefficient is not greater than the earlier sub-period 
coefficient at the 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively. 
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Table 2C: Pre-reform robustness test for 3-year real returns 
Year Coefficient NW standard error t-stats p-value R2 No. of 
obs 
1931–50 0.70 0.17 4.19 0.00 0.54 20 
1931–51 0.68 0.15 4.47 0.00 0.53 21 
1931–52 0.68 0.15 4.64 0.00 0.52 22 
1931–53 0.68 0.14 4.74 0.00 0.52 23 
1931–54 0.68 0.14 4.80 0.00 0.51 24 
1931–55 0.68 0.14 4.73 0.00 0.51 25 
1931–56 0.69 0.14 4.99 0.00 0.50 26 
1931–57 0.70 0.14 5.13 0.00 0.49 27 
1931–58 0.72 0.13 5.37 0.00 0.50 28 
1931–59 0.72 0.13 5.36 0.00 0.50 29 
1931–60 0.71 0.13 5.35 0.00 0.48 30 
1931–61 0.72 0.13 5.53 0.00 0.48 31 
1931–62 0.72 0.13 5.57 0.00 0.48 32 
1931–63 0.71 0.13 5.46 0.00 0.46 33 
 
     
 
1952–84  0.46* 0.29 1.59 0.12 0.13 33 
1953–84  0.49* 0.29 1.66 0.11 0.14 32 
1954–84  0.50* 0.30 1.69 0.10 0.14 31 
1955–84  0.52* 0.30 1.73 0.09 0.15 30 
1956–84  0.52* 0.31 1.70 0.10 0.14 29 
1957–84  0.55* 0.31 1.79 0.09 0.16 28 
1958–84   0.59** 0.31 1.93 0.07 0.18 27 
1959–84   0.62** 0.31 2.03 0.05 0.20 26 
1960–84   0.64** 0.31 2.07 0.05 0.20 25 
1961–84 0.71 0.31 2.31 0.03 0.23 24 
1962–84 0.77 0.30 2.59 0.02 0.26 23 
1963–84 0.80 0.30 2.69 0.01 0.28 22 
1964–84   0.82** 0.31 2.68 0.02 0.27 21 
1965–84 0.79 0.33 2.40 0.03 0.24 20 
The coefficients were obtained using the direct approach. * and ** indicate that 
the latter sub-period coefficient is not greater than the earlier sub-period 
coefficient at the 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively. 
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Table 3C: Pre-reform robustness test for 5-year real returns 
Year Coefficient NW standard error t-stats p-value R2 No. of 
obs 
1931–50 0.79 0.09 8.48 0.00 0.64 20 
1931–51 0.75 0.08 9.31 0.00 0.61 21 
1931–52 0.76 0.08 9.74 0.00 0.57 22 
1931–53 0.76 0.08 9.78 0.00 0.58 23 
1931–54 0.76 0.08 9.54 0.00 0.55 24 
1931–55 0.76 0.09 8.91 0.00 0.51 25 
1931–56 0.77 0.09 8.45 0.00 0.51 26 
1931–57 0.78 0.10 8.04 0.00 0.51 27 
1931–58 0.82 0.13 6.50 0.00 0.50 28 
1931–59 0.83 0.13 6.21 0.00 0.49 29 
1931–60 0.82 0.13 6.18 0.00 0.49 30 
1931–61 0.82 0.13 6.23 0.00 0.49 31 
1931–62 0.80 0.12 6.66 0.00 0.47 32 
1931–63 0.79 0.12 6.77 0.00 0.46 33 
 
     
 
1952–84  0.63* 0.33 1.90 0.07 0.14 33 
1953–84   0.66** 0.33 1.99 0.06 0.15 32 
1954–84   0.67** 0.34 1.99 0.06 0.16 31 
1955–84 0.71 0.34 2.10 0.05 0.17 30 
1956–84 0.77 0.34 2.25 0.03 0.19 29 
1957–84 0.80 0.34 2.32 0.03 0.20 28 
1958–84 0.84 0.35 2.43 0.02 0.22 27 
1959–84   0.89** 0.34 2.60 0.02 0.25 26 
1960–84  0.95* 0.34 2.79 0.01 0.27 25 
1961–84  1.04* 0.34 3.03 0.01 0.30 24 
1962–84  1.09* 0.34 3.19 0.00 0.32 23 
1963–84  1.11* 0.35 3.16 0.01 0.32 22 
1964–84  1.16* 0.35 3.37 0.00 0.33 21 
1965–84  1.30* 0.31 4.26 0.00 0.37 20 
The coefficients were obtained using the direct approach. * and ** indicate that 
the latter sub-period coefficient is not greater than the earlier sub-period 
coefficient at the 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively. 
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Table 4C: Pre-reform robustness test for 1-year excess returns (er) 
Year Coefficient NW standard error t-stats p-value R2 No. of 
obs 
1931–50 0.08 0.13 0.58 0.57 0.03 20 
1931–51 0.12 0.14 0.89 0.39 0.07 21 
1931–52 0.12 0.14 0.89 0.39 0.07 22 
1931–53 0.12 0.14 0.92 0.37 0.07 23 
1931–54 0.12 0.14 0.92 0.37 0.07 24 
1931–55 0.12 0.13 0.93 0.36 0.07 25 
1931–56 0.13 0.13 0.96 0.35 0.08 26 
1931–57 0.12 0.13 0.94 0.36 0.07 27 
1931–58 0.16 0.14 1.14 0.26 0.08 28 
1931–59 0.16 0.14 1.16 0.26 0.08 29 
1931–60 0.17 0.14 1.24 0.22 0.09 30 
1931–61 0.17 0.14 1.26 0.22 0.09 31 
1931–62 0.19 0.14 1.36 0.18 0.10 32 
1931–63 0.19 0.14 1.37 0.18 0.10 33 
 
      1952–84 0.31* 0.12 2.55 0.02 0.18 33 
1953–84 0.33* 0.12 2.66 0.01 0.19 32 
1954–84 0.34* 0.12 2.74 0.01 0.20 31 
1955–84 0.35* 0.13 2.76 0.01 0.20 30 
1956–84 0.36* 0.13 2.76 0.01 0.20 29 
1957–84 0.37* 0.13 2.83 0.01 0.21 28 
1958–84 0.35* 0.13 2.69 0.01 0.20 27 
1959–84 0.38* 0.13 2.96 0.01 0.24 26 
1960–84 0.40* 0.13 3.08 0.01 0.25 25 
1961–84 0.39* 0.14 2.83 0.01 0.23 24 
1962–84 0.41* 0.14 2.90 0.01 0.24 23 
1963–84 0.43* 0.14 3.12 0.01 0.26 22 
1964–84 0.46* 0.14 3.33 0.00 0.28 21 
1965–84 0.45* 0.15 3.05 0.01 0.26 20 
The coefficients were obtained using the direct approach. * and ** indicate that 
the latter sub-period coefficient is not greater than the earlier sub-period 
coefficient at the 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively. 
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Table 5C: Pre-reform robustness test for 3-year excess returns (er) 
Year Coefficient NW standard error t-stats p-value R2 No. of 
obs 
1931–50 0.42 0.11 3.77 0.00 0.40 20 
1931–51 0.40 0.10 4.10 0.00 0.39 21 
1931–52 0.41 0.09 4.33 0.00 0.37 22 
1931–53 0.41 0.09 4.42 0.00 0.37 23 
1931–54 0.41 0.09 4.47 0.00 0.37 24 
1931–55 0.41 0.09 4.36 0.00 0.36 25 
1931–56 0.42 0.09 4.63 0.00 0.36 26 
1931–57 0.42 0.09 4.76 0.00 0.35 27 
1931–58 0.44 0.09 4.89 0.00 0.36 28 
1931–59 0.43 0.09 4.83 0.00 0.35 29 
1931–60 0.43 0.09 4.89 0.00 0.35 30 
1931–61 0.44 0.09 5.03 0.00 0.35 31 
1931–62 0.44 0.09 5.04 0.00 0.35 32 
1931–63 0.43 0.09 4.83 0.00 0.31 33 
 
      1952–84 0.61* 0.23 2.66 0.01 0.29 33 
1953–84 0.63* 0.23 2.77 0.01 0.31 32 
1954–84 0.64* 0.23 2.80 0.01 0.31 31 
1955–84 0.66* 0.23 2.83 0.01 0.32 30 
1956–84 0.66* 0.24 2.77 0.01 0.31 29 
1957–84 0.68* 0.24 2.89 0.01 0.33 28 
1958–84 0.72* 0.24 3.04 0.01 0.35 27 
1959–84 0.74* 0.24 3.13 0.01 0.37 26 
1960–84 0.74* 0.24 3.11 0.01 0.36 25 
1961–84 0.79* 0.24 3.30 0.00 0.37 24 
1962–84 0.84* 0.24 3.58 0.00 0.41 23 
1963–84 0.86* 0.24 3.63 0.00 0.41 22 
1964–84 0.85* 0.24 3.53 0.00 0.40 21 
1965–84 0.79* 0.26 3.07 0.01 0.34 20 
The coefficients were obtained using the direct approach. * and ** indicate that 
the latter sub-period coefficient is not greater than the earlier sub-period 
coefficient at the 0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively. 
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Table 6C: Pre-reform robustness test for 5-year excess returns (er) 
Year Coefficient NW standard error t-stats p-value R2 No. of 
obs 
1931–50 0.44 0.10 4.37 0.00 0.38 20 
1931–51 0.43 0.09 4.62 0.00 0.38 21 
1931–52 0.43 0.09 4.85 0.00 0.35 22 
1931–53 0.43 0.09 4.89 0.00 0.35 23 
1931–54 0.43 0.09 4.95 0.00 0.33 24 
1931–55 0.43 0.09 4.93 0.00 0.31 25 
1931–56 0.43 0.09 4.95 0.00 0.32 26 
1931–57 0.44 0.09 4.93 0.00 0.32 27 
1931–58 0.47 0.10 4.50 0.00 0.32 28 
1931–59 0.47 0.11 4.47 0.00 0.32 29 
1931–60 0.48 0.11 4.45 0.00 0.33 30 
1931–61 0.47 0.10 4.56 0.00 0.32 31 
1931–62 0.45 0.10 4.68 0.00 0.28 32 
1931–63 0.44 0.09 4.68 0.00 0.28 33 
 
      1952–84 0.74* 0.25 2.90 0.01 0.27 33 
1953–84 0.77* 0.25 3.05 0.01 0.28 32 
1954–84 0.77* 0.25 3.04 0.01 0.28 31 
1955–84 0.81* 0.25 3.21 0.00 0.30 30 
1956–84 0.85* 0.25 3.44 0.00 0.32 29 
1957–84 0.87* 0.25 3.51 0.00 0.33 28 
1958–84 0.89* 0.25 3.62 0.00 0.33 27 
1959–84 0.93* 0.24 3.81 0.00 0.36 26 
1960–84 0.96* 0.24 3.97 0.00 0.37 25 
1961–84 1.01* 0.25 4.07 0.00 0.38 24 
1962–84 1.03* 0.25 4.12 0.00 0.38 23 
1963–84 1.03* 0.26 3.98 0.00 0.37 22 
1964–84 1.05* 0.26 4.03 0.00 0.37 21 
1965–84 1.13* 0.25 4.56 0.00 0.38 20 
The coefficients were obtained using the direct approach. * and ** indicate that the 
latter sub-period coefficient is not greater than the earlier sub-period coefficient at the 
0.05 and 0.1 level, respectively. 
 
 
 
